The Appeal Deadline & Subsequent Rule 59(e) Motions


The Fifth Circuit held that the grant of a Rule 59(e) motion that resolved an ambiguity in the original judgment allowed a second Rule 59(e) motion to reset the appeal clock.


In Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB v. Myers, the Fifth Circuit held that the grant of a Rule 59(e) motion results in a new judgment, such that a second Rule 59(e) motion reset the appeal clock. The decision illustrates the seemingly rare scenario in which a subsequent post-judgment motion can extend the time to appeal.

Resetting the Appeal Deadline With Post-Judgement Motions

Under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(4), certain post-judgment motions—including motions to alter or amend the judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59—reset the appeal deadline. But that rule normally applies only to the first motion (or first group of motions, if multiple are filed together). Successive post-judgment motions generally don’t reset the appeal deadline. That is, a party cannot reset the appeal deadline with one post-judgment motion and then, after the district court disposes of that motion, reset the deadline again with a second motion. Otherwise litigants could forever stall the appeal clock.

Post-Judgment Motions After the Grant of an Earlier Motion

But what if the district court grants a Rule 59(e) motion and alters the original judgment? In FTC v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., the Supreme Court held that an amended judgment starts a new appeal period when the amendment (1) changes matters of substance or (2) resolves a genuine ambiguity.

Courts have read Minneapolis-Honeywell to mean that the grant of a Rule 59(e) motion can create a new judgment. That new judgment can provide a new opportunity for post-judgment motions. And those additional post-judgment motions can again reset the appeal deadline.

The Successive Motion in Wilmington Savings

That’s what happened in Wilmington Savings. The district court’s initial judgment carried an incorrect title—it was labeled a motion for summary judgment, which the district court had apparently copied from a party’s filing. The defendants accordingly filed a Rule 59(e) motion that (among many other things) sought to correct the label to make it clear that the district court had entered a final judgment. The district court granted this part of the motion and amended the judgment’s title.

The defendants then filed a second Rule 59(e) motion that rehashed many of the same arguments but also presented “new evidence.” The district court denied this motion, after which the defendants appealed.

A New Judgment & New Post-Judgment Opportunity

If the time to appeal was calculated from the disposition of the first Rule 59(e) motion, the defendants’ appeal in Wilmington Savings was late. But the Fifth Circuit held that the appeal clock started with the disposition of the second motion.

Given the mis-titling, the district court’s initial judgment was unclear as to its legal effect. That created a “genuine ambiguity” under Minneapolis-Honeywell.

So the correction of that ambiguity started a new appeal clock. The second Rule 59(e) motion then reset that clock. And the defendants appealed within 30 days of the district court’s denying their second motion.

Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB v. Myers, 2024 WL 1146658 (5th Cir. Mar. 18, 2024), available at the Fifth Circuit and Westlaw