Steinman on Appellate Review of Civil Juries

Courts of appeals sometimes review jury verdicts de novo by characterizing an issue as a “legal” one (as opposed to a “factual” one). As much can be seen in this week’s Supreme Court decision in Google LLC v. Oracle America, Inc., in which the Court said that “the ultimate question of whether [the facts found by the jury] showed a ‘fair use’ is a legal question for judges to decide de novo.”

In a new article—Appellate Courts and Civil Juries—Adam Steinman argues that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50’s reasonable-jury standard governs appellate review of civil-jury verdicts, regardless of whether a particular issue would be treated as “legal” in other contexts. The distinction between factual and legal issues can be relevant elsewhere, such as when determining whether the Seventh Amendment’s jury-trial guarantee applies or when reviewing a district court judge’s decision on a particular issue. But that characterization, Steinman contends, should not affect the standard of review for civil-jury verdicts. When it comes to reviewing those verdicts, “Rule 50 requires deference to the jury’s conclusion on a particular issue unless that conclusion is unreasonable.” So an appellate court can refine the substantive law or police the burden of production, which preserves the court’s law-development function. But that court must “earn its ability to second-guess the jury by providing the sort of legal clarification that would benefit courts and litigants going forward.”

The article came out a few weeks ago in the Wisconsin Law Review. The abstract is below, and the article is available on SSRN. It’s well worth a read.

In federal civil litigation, decisionmaking power is shared by juries, trial courts, and appellate courts. This Article examines an unresolved tension in the different doctrines that allocate authority among these institutions, one that has led to confusion surrounding the relationship between appellate courts and civil juries. At base, the current uncertainty stems from a longstanding lack of clarity regarding the distinction between matters of law and matters of fact. The high-stakes Oracle-Google litigation—which is now before the Supreme Court—exemplifies this. In that case, the Federal Circuit reasoned that an appellate court may assert de novo review over a jury’s verdict simply by characterizing a particular issue as legal rather than factual. But this approach misperceives the approach demanded by Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which permits judicial override of a jury’s verdict only when “a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis” to reach such a verdict.

Rule 50’s reasonable-jury standard does not permit de novo review of a jury’s verdict on a particular issue. Rather, it requires deference to the jury’s conclusion on that issue unless the reviewing court can explain why principles of substantive law or other aspects of the trial record render that verdict unreasonable. This deferential standard of review faithfully implements the text and structure of the Federal Rules and respects the jury’s role in our federal system. Yet, it also preserves appellate courts’ ability to provide meaningful clarification that will guide future decisionmakers.

Adam N. Steinman, Appellate Courts and Civil Juries, 2021 Wisconsin Law Review 1, available at SSRN.