The Sixth Circuit joined the “no jurisdiction” side of the split on whether courts can review Heck issues as part of a qualified-immunity appeal. But it probably went too far in reviewing a judicial-estoppel argument.
April 17, 2024
In Chaney-Snell v. Young, the Sixth Circuit held that Heck v. Humphrey issues are outside the scope of qualified-immunity appeals. In doing so, the Sixth Circuit joined the majority of circuits in the (lopsided) split on this matter. The court went on, however, to extend pendent appellate jurisdiction to a judicial-estoppel argument. Extending jurisdiction was necessary, the court explained, to effectively review the denial of qualified immunity.
While I agree with the Heck holding, I don’t agree with the review of the judicial-estoppel issue. The court’s rationale on the latter point would seem to allow plenary review of the factual basis for a district court’s immunity denial. And Johnson v. Jones normally prohibits that sort of review.
(For more on the scope of qualified-immunity appeals, see my article, Reforming Qualified-Immunity Appeals.)
The Denial of Qualified Immunity in Chaney-Snell
Chaney-Snell stemmed from the plaintiff’s arrest on drug charges. The plaintiff sued two of the arresting officers for excessive force. And the parties disagreed about what happened during the arrest.
Simplifying only a little bit, the plaintiff alleged that one of the defendants twice punched him without provocation. The plaintiff fell to the floor and offered no resistance. But an officer then kneed the plaintiff in the back with the officer’s full weight
The defendants said that neither punched the plaintiff. They instead contended that the plaintiff refused to comply with their orders to raise his hands. So one officer tackled the plaintiff to the ground and, when the plaintiff resisted, struck the plaintiff with a knee to get the plaintiff to place his arms behind his back.
The district court denied the officers’ request for qualified immunity. As the district court saw things, a reasonable jury could find that the plaintiff was not resisting, an officer punched the plaintiff without cause, and an officer kneed the plaintiff without cause. The district court accordingly denied qualified immunity. The officers then appealed.
The Scope of the Officers’ Appeal
On appeal, the officer who allegedly punched the plaintiff renewed two arguments he had made in the district court that went beyond the normal qualified-immunity inquiry. Both arguments concerned the district court’s assumption that the officer had punched the plaintiff without reason. First the defendant argued that under Heck v. Humphrey, the plaintiff’s criminal conviction prevented the plaintiff from arguing that he didn’t resist arrest. Second, the defendant argued that the plaintiff was judicially estopped from arguing that he didn’t resist arrest.
The Sixth Circuit accordingly had to determine the scope of its appellate jurisdiction before addressing qualified immunity.
Pendent Appellate Jurisdiction Over the Heck Argument
After his arrest, the plaintiff had pleaded guilty to attempting to resist arrest. The defendant argued that the plaintiff’s excessive-force argument was inconsistent with this guilty plea. Were that the case, Heck would require that the plaintiff obtain a vacatur of the criminal conviction before seeking relief.
The Sixth Circuit suggested that there might be something to the officer’s argument. Under Michigan law, a conviction for resisting arrest requires showing that the officers made a lawful arrest. A claim that officers used excessive force is inconsistent with that showing.
But the Sixth Circuit lacked jurisdiction over the Heck issue. The only proffered ground for appellate jurisdiction was pendent appellate jurisdiction. Pendent appellate jurisdiction allows a normally non-appealable issue to tag along with an appealable one. As most courts of appeals have applied the doctrine, pendent appellate jurisdiction can apply in two scenarios: (1) the appealable issue necessarily resolves the non-appealable one, or (2) review of the non-appealable issue is necessary to provide meaningful review of the appealable one.
Sixth Circuit caselaw has been inconsistent on this issue, with unpublished decisions going both ways. In Chaney-Snell, the Sixth Circuit definitively held that it would not extend pendent appellate jurisdiction over Heck issues.
For one thing, resolution of the qualified-immunity defense does not necessarily resolve the Heck issue:
The qualified-immunity issue asks a question about the Fourth Amendment: Did our cases clearly establish that Young’s (allegedly) gratuitous force violated that amendment? The Heck issue asks a question about Michigan law: Does Chanel-Snell’s claim that Young punched him “imply the invalidity of his conviction” under the resisting-arrest statute? These two inquiries are not “intertwined” at all—let alone inextricably so.
(Citations omitted.)
For another, the court could meaningfully review the qualified-immunity defense without considering Heck. Again, the two inquiries involve different legal standards. And Heck does not affect the factual basis for assessing qualified immunity:
Heck does not exist to identify the facts that are in “genuine dispute” at the summary-judgment stage. It exists to determine whether (and when) a § 1983 plaintiff has “a complete and present cause of action[.]” If the plaintiff’s version of the facts implies the invalidity of the prior conviction, Heck means that the § 1983 claim is not “cognizable” until the defendant overturns the conviction. So a court should dismiss the § 1983 claim—not continue to litigate it under the officer’s version of the facts.
(Citations omitted.)
Indeed, addressing the Heck issue might lead to a judgment different from what the defendant sought. A judgment on Heck grounds would mean a dismissal without prejudice. But the defendant wanted a dismissal on qualified-immunity grounds, which would be with prejudice.
The Sixth Circuit ended by addressing one argument that the defendant didn’t make: that Heck is part of the qualified-immunity inquiry because it affects whether the plaintiff has a valid theory of recovery. The court analogized to the Bivens question, which the Supreme Court has held can be addressed in a qualified-immunity appeal. But unlike Bivens, Heck affects potential preconditions to a valid theory of recover, not that theory’s existence.
Pendent Appellate Jurisdiction Over the Judicial Estoppel Argument
The Sixth Circuit went to address the defendant’s judicial-estoppel argument. When pleading guilty to attempted resisting arrest, the plaintiff had conceded that he had failed to comply with the defendants’ lawful orders. The defendant contended that this admission precluded the plaintiff from alleging that an officer punched him after he had surrendered.
The Sixth Circuit determined that this argument was within its pendent appellate jurisdiction.
Unlike the Heck argument, the estoppel argument concerned the factual basis for the immunity denial. That is, if the plaintiff had admitted in a prior proceeding that the defendant did not punch him, he might be barred from arguing the opposite in this action. There would then be no genuine dispute as to the punch.
So according to the court, the defendant’s qualified-immunity defense could not be resolved without first addressing the estoppel argument. Meaningful review of immunity required addressing estoppel. To bolster this holding, the Sixth Circuit cited cases in which it had addressed preclusion issues in qualified-immunity appeals.
One Step Forward, One Step Back
I think the Sixth Circuit correctly held that it could not review the Heck issue in a qualified-immunity appeal. But I disagree on the estoppel point.
Correct on Heck
On the Heck issue, the Sixth Circuit is 100% correct that it can effectively review the denial of qualified immunity without even thinking about Heck. The opinion is particularly persuasive in explaining the role that Heck plays in civil-rights litigation. Heck does not implicate the factual basis for an immunity denial. It instead creates a precondition to the underlying claim.
The Sixth Circuit joined the majority of courts in holding that Heck issues are outside the scope of qualified-immunity appeals. But I think the Sixth Circuit might have minimized the existence of a split. The court noted that the Fifth Circuit disagrees on this point. But the Sixth Circuit also noted that the Fifth Circuit caselaw is not entirely consistent. That’s true. But the Fifth Circuit appears to now be squarely hold that the Heck issue within the scope of qualified-immunity appeals.
The Bivens Analogy
I also agree with the Sixth Circuit that the Bivens analogy is not persuasive. Perhaps that’s because I don’t think the Bivens question should be part of a qualified-immunity appeal. (I have a short essay on this point for anyone interested.) But even if we take the inclusion of Bivens issues in these appeals as given, the Heck inquiry is different.
The Supreme Court initially held that a court could address the elements of a Bivens theory in a qualified-immunity appeal because doing so was necessary to determine whether the plaintiff had alleged a constitutional violation. That makes some sense. Without knowing what a plaintiff would have to show to prevail, a court cannot determine whether the plaintiff has made that showing.
The Supreme Court then extended this reasoning to the existence of a Bivens theory. The logic goes that before a court can determine the elements of a Bivens theory, it must first determine the existence of a Bivens theory.
Heck is different. As the Sixth Circuit explained, it addresses whether a plaintiff has satisfied any preconditions to bringing a civil-rights claim. It does not address the abstract existence of that claim.
Wrong on Estoppel
But on the estoppel issue, the Sixth Circuit was wrong. The court reasoned that addressing estoppel was necessary to determine the factual basis for the immunity denial. But the factual basis for an immunity denial is supposed to be outside the scope of qualified-immunity appeals. That’s the whole point of Johnson v. Jones.
The Sixth Circuit’s reasoning would seem to encompass issues like evidence sufficiency and perhaps even the admissibility of evidence. But nearly all courts—including the Sixth Circuit—hold that those issues are outside the scope of qualified immunity appeals. Indeed, the Sixth Circuit has said that it would not review a district court’s decision to consider even the “rankest hearsay” when determining the factual basis for an immunity defense.
And rightfully so. Johnson meant to limit the scope of qualified-immunity appeals to the issues that (arguably) warrant immediate review: did the defendants violate the law, and was that law clearly established?
Thanks to Michael Solimine for sending this case my way.
Chaney-Snell v. Young, 2024 WL 1616406 (6th Cir. Apr. 15, 2024), available at the Sixth Circuit and Westlaw