The Month in Federal Appellate Jurisdiction: April 2025

April saw more decisions on whether temporary restraining orders were appealable injunctions. The Eleventh Circuit addressed the immediate appealability of Florida’s litigation privileges. And another court of appeals held that defendants cannot immediately appeal from the denial of a church-autonomy defense.

Let’s start, however, with a particularly interested decision on what counts as a claim for purposes of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b).

• Claims & Theories in Rule 54(b) Appeals
• More Appeals from TROs
• Appealing Florida’s Litigation Privileges
• Another Court Rejects Church-Autonomy Appeals
• Appealing the Government’s Voluntary Dismissal of a Qui Tam Suit
• The Month’s Improper Qualified-Immunity Appeals
• Quick Notes

Claims & Theories in Rule 54(b) Appeals

In Diaz v. FCA US LLC, the Third Circuit split over whether a district court had resolved distinct claims for purposes of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). The majority concluded that the district court had resolved only a distinct theory of recovery, not a distinct claim. Dissenting, Judge Phipps argued that claims are defined by their elements, and the resolved and unresolved claims in the case had distinct elements.

Read more: Claims & Theories in Rule 54(b) Appeals

Diaz v. FCA US LLC, 2025 WL 1109297 (3d Cir. Apr. 15, 2025), available at the Third Circuit and Westlaw

More Appeals from TROs

In Department of Education v. California, the Supreme Court stayed a temporary restraining order that prevented the government from terminating education-related grants. The Court treated the TRO as a preliminary injunction, as the order “carrie[d] many of the hallmarks of a preliminary injunction” (though the Court did not expand on those hallmarks).

Justice Jackson dissented, arguing (among other things) that the TRO was not immediately appealable. The TRO merely ordered the government to maintain the status quo—that is, prohibit the government from implementing “abruptly announced terminations” of funding (the government could still terminate grants consistent with “reasoned, individualized grant determinations under its usual review process”). The TRO was also “expressly time limited,” set to expire only three days later. So this TRO neither imposed serious, perhaps irreparable, consequences nor was of potentially indefinite duration.

Department of Education v. California, 2025 WL 1008354 (Apr. 4, 2025), available at the Supreme Court and Westlaw

Appealing Florida’s Litigation Privileges

In Grippa v. Rubin, the Eleventh Circuit addressed the immediate appealability of Florida’s absolute and qualified litigation privileges. The court determined that the absolute privilege was immediately appealable via the collateral-order doctrine. But the qualified litigation privilege was not.

Read more: Appealing Florida’s Litigation Privileges

Grippa v. Rubin, 2025 WL 997347 (11th Cir. Apr. 3, 2025), available at the Eleventh Circuit and Westlaw

Another Court Rejects Church-Autonomy Appeals

In O’Connell v. United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, the D.C. Circuit held that a defendant could not immediately appeal a rejection of the church-autonomy defense via the collateral-order doctrine. The court explained that those denials are effectively reviewable in an appeal from a final judgment. In doing so, the D.C. Circuit joined every other court of appeals to address this issue.

O’Connell v. United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, 2025 WL 1198433 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 25, 2025), available at the D.C. Circuit and Westlaw

Appealing the Government’s Voluntary Dismissal of a Qui Tam Suit

In Vanderlan v. United States, the Fifth Circuit held that it could review a relator’s appeal from the United States’s decision to voluntarily dismiss a qui tam suit.

Simplifying quite a bit, the relator in Vanderlan brought an action under the False Claims Act against a hospital. Although the United States declined to intervene, it eventually moved to dismiss the action. The dismissal was to be with prejudice for the relator but without prejudice for the government. The district court granted the dismissal. The relator appealed.

Before reaching the merits, the Fifth Circuit paused to consider its appellate jurisdiction. The court noted that a dismissal without prejudice is normally not an appealable final judgment. And the dismissal in Vanderlan was without prejudice insofar as it concerned the United States.

But the dismissal was with prejudice when it came to the relator, which was the appealing party. That sufficed to make the dismissal a final decision.

The Fifth Circuit added in a footnote that the dismissal was also effectively with prejudice for the government, as the statute of limitations had run on the claims. Notably, this was apparently the first time the Fifth Circuit had so held in a published opinion. The court also noted that this “rule holds unless the parties collusively agree to waive the statute of limitations upon appeal.”

The jurisdictional detour in Vanderlan illustrates one of the problems with treating without-prejudice dismissals as non-final decisions. The relator-appellant in Vanderlan was aggrieved by the district court’s decision (the district court had dismissed his claims) and the district court proceedings were over. To suggest that there was no final decision is to suggest that there was no way for the relator to appeal the adverse decision. It might be much better—simpler, clearer, and more predictable—to simply say that a final decision always exists once a district court has finished with an action.

Vanderlan v. United States, 2025 WL 1143390 (5th Cir. Apr. 18, 2025), available at the Fifth Circuit and Westlaw

The Month’s Improper Qualified-Immunity Appeals

Here are last month’s improper, fact-based qualified-immunity appeals:

• Smith v. Whitsel, 2025 WL 1135232 (7th Cir. Apr. 17, 2025), available at the Seventh Circuit and Westlaw
• Love v. Grashorn, 2025 WL 1162842 (10th Cir. Apr. 22, 2025), available at the Tenth Circuit and Westlaw
• Lacaze v. Gourley, 2025 WL 1216716 (10th Cir. Apr. 28, 2025), available at the Tenth Circuit and Westlaw

Quick Notes

In Branson v. Harris, the Fifth Circuit declined to exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction over an issue—whether a plaintiff had offered sufficient evidence supporting every element of her claim—because the district court had not addressed that issue first. The court noted that it was a court of review, not first view.

Branson v. Harris, 2025 WL 1000172 (5th Cir. Apr. 3, 2025), available at the Fifth Circuit and Westlaw

In Doe v. University of North Carolina System, the Fourth Circuit declined to exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction over the refusal to dismiss a Title IX claim. The court had jurisdiction to review the district court’s denial of sovereign and qualified immunity on several of the plaintiff’s claims. But those immunity issues did not necessarily resolve whether the plaintiff had plausibly stated a claim for sex discrimination, nor did the court need to address the Title IX claim to resolve immunity.

Doe v. University of North Carolina System, 2025 WL 1006277 (4th Cir. Apr. 4, 2025), available at the Fourth Circuit and Westlaw

In Aniniba v. Aurora Public Schools, the Tenth Circuit treated an untimely, post-judgment objection to a dismissal as a motion for reconsideration under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). And even though the district court struck that objection, the Tenth Circuit held that it reset the appeal deadline under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4.

Aniniba v. Aurora Public Schools, 2025 WL 1010269 (10th Cir. Apr. 1, 2025), available at the Tenth Circuit and Westlaw

In Holley v. Combs, the Fourth Circuit said that it would review the denial of leave to proceed in forma pauperis even though the appellant’s “notice of appeal only sought review of the denial of his motion for reconsideration.” The court explained that the substance of the appellant’s brief addressed that issue.

I’ll note that this discussion was likely unnecessary. After the recent amendments to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(c), designating the reconsideration denial was sufficient to appeal the underlying judgment and all orders that merged into it.

Holley v. Combs, 2025 WL 1035288 (4th Cir. Apr. 8, 2025), available at the Fourth Circuit and Westlaw

In Mississippi v. JXN Water, the Fifth Circuit heard an immediate appeal from a district court decision deeming a receiver a “federal assistance program” under the Food and Nutrition Act of 2008. The decision gave the receiver access to data on recipients of the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program. The Fifth Circuit held that this decision was appealable via the collateral-order doctrine.

Mississippi v. JXN Water, 2025 WL 1076888 (5th Cir. Apr. 10, 2025), available at the Fifth Circuit and Westlaw

And in Galanakis v. City of Newton, the Eighth Circuit declined to extend pendent appellate jurisdiction to a denial of statutory immunity under Iowa law. The court had jurisdiction to review the denial of qualified immunity on a false-arrest claim insofar as the claim involved federal law. But Iowa’s false-arrest law has a different liability standard. That meant the resolution of the federal issues would not necessarily resolve the state ones. So pendent appellate jurisdiction was inappropriate.

Galanakis v. City of Newton, 2025 WL 1132826 (8th Cir. Apr. 17, 2025), available at the Eighth Circuit and Westlaw