The Month in Federal Appellate Jurisdiction: June 2025


July 7, 2025
By Bryan Lammon

Last month saw the last Supreme Court decision from this term on appellate jurisdiction. The Court held that a notice of appeal filed before the district court reopens the time to appeal relates forward to that reopening.

In the courts of appeals, we saw decisions on automatic stays for remand appeals, the various ways to deal with deficient final judgments, and some issues regarding preservation, waiver, and forfeiture. There was also a contempt appeal with a specific-but-unspecified sanction. Plus (as seemingly always) some improper qualified-immunity appeals and more.

Parrish & Relating Forward Notices of Appeal

Disclosure: I filed amicus briefs in support of the petitioner in Parrish in both the Fourth Circuit and the Supreme Court.

In Parrish v. United States, the Supreme Court held that a notice of appeal filed before the appeal period is reopened under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(6) relates forward to the date reopening is granted.

Read more: Parrish & Relating Forward Notices of Appeal

Parrish v. United States, 2025 WL 1657416 (June 12, 2025), available at Error and Westlaw

Ninth Circuit: No Automatic Stays for Remand Appeals

In People ex rel Harrison v. Express Scripts, Inc., the Ninth Circuit held that an appeal from a remand order does not automatically stay the remand. In so holding, the Ninth Circuit weighed in on the split over whether the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Coinbase, Inc. v. Bielski requires a stay after a remand appeal. Most courts hold that stays are optional and governed by Nken v. Holder. Only the Fourth Circuit has held that stays are mandatory.

Read more: Ninth Circuit: No Automatic Stays for Remand Appeals

People ex rel Harrison v. Express Scripts, Inc., 2025 WL 1551414 (9th Cir. June 2, 2025), available at the Ninth Circuit and Westlaw

Dealing with Deficient Final Judgments

In Grunt Style LLC v. TWD, LLC, the Seventh Circuit issued a limited remand for the district court to correct an oversight in its final judgment. In the course of doing so, the court spoke at some length about the problems of—and potential solutions to—judgments that fail to mention one or more claims.

Read more: Dealing with Deficient Final Judgments

Grunt Style LLC v. TWD, LLC, 2025 WL 1662144 (7th Cir. June 12, 2025), available at the Seventh Circuit and Westlaw

Narrowing v. Denying Permanent Injunctive Relief

In Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Illinois Mine Subsidence Insurance Fund, the Seventh Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to immediately review an order that narrowed the potential injunctive relief in an action.

The plaintiff in Union Pacific sought to permanently enjoin the defendant from bringing certain claims against the plaintiff. The district court rejected some of a plaintiff’s theories of relief, which limited the scope of any possible permanent injunction. The plaintiff then tried to appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).

Although the Seventh Circuit generally allows appeals from interlocutory orders denying permanent injunctions, the court of appeals held that the district court’s order had not denied an injunction. The order had instead only narrowed the possible injunction. And the issues that remained pending in the district court overlapped significantly with those in the appeal. The Seventh Circuit accordingly dismissed the appeal.

The Seventh Circuit ended by noting that it might one day need to reconsider its rule allowing appeals from the denial of permanent injunctions. But Union Pacific was not the case to do so.

Read more: Narrowing v. Denying Permanent Injunctive Relief

Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Illinois Mine Subsidence Insurance Fund, 2025 WL 1554415 (7th Cir. June 2, 2025), available at the Seventh Circuit and Westlaw

Waiving (or Forfeiting) an Unconditional Guilty Plea

In United States v. Riojas, the Fifth Circuit held that the government can waive or forfeit the waivers inherent in an unconditional guilty plea. That’s because waiver (as the Fifth Circuit recently said in an unrelated context) is not jurisdictional. So there is no requirement that a court of appeals raise or enforce an unconditional guilty plea on the court’s own initiative.

Read more: Waiving (or Forfeiting) an Unconditional Guilty Plea

United States v. Riojas, 2025 WL 1571825 (5th Cir. June 4, 2025), available at the Fifth Circuit and Westlaw

Contempt Appeals with Specific-but-Unspecified Contempt Sanctions

In Coomer v. Make Your Life Epic, LLC, the Tenth Circuit held that it could review an order holding a non-party in civil contempt. Although the exact amount the party would have to pay was undetermined, the order was sufficiently specific in requiring a “sum certain” of $1,000/day. And although the district court had not yet determined the amount of attorneys fees owed for the contempt, those fees were collateral to the civil contempt and thus did not preclude finality.

Read more: Contempt Appeals with Specific-but- Unspecified Contempt Sanctions

Coomer v. Make Your Life Epic, LLC, 2025 WL 1701776 (10th Cir. June 18, 2025), available at the Tenth Circuit and Westlaw

Jurisdiction, Preservation & the Failure to Object to a Magistrate Judge’s Order

In United States v. Cabrera-Rivas, the Fourth Circuit held that failure to object to a magistrate judge’s decision does not affect appellate jurisdiction. The failure instead implicates preservation. In so holding, the Fourth Circuit agreed with the Sixth Circuit but split with the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits.

Read more: Jurisdiction, Preservation & the Failure to Object to a Magistrate Judge’s Order

Appellate Jurisdiction Over the Refusal to Terminate Supervised Release

In United States v. Tavarez, the Sixth Circuit held that 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) does not bar review of the denial of a motion to terminate supervised release.

The defendant in Tavarez was granted compassionate release from his custodial sentence and placed on supervised release for the remainder of that initial sentence. He later asked the district court to terminate his supervised release early. The district court refused.

The defendant then appealed. The government responded that § 3742(a) barred the appeal. Section 3742(a) says that “[a] defendant may file a notice of appeal in the district court for review of an otherwise final sentence” in various circumstances, such as an illegal sentence or one that violates the sentencing guidelines. According to the government, a motion for early termination of supervised release does not fall within any of § 3742(a) circumstances.

But the Sixth Circuit has already held that § 3742(a) does not apply to a denial of relief under the First Step Act (though the Sixth Circuit had sent some mixed signals on that point). In the course of doing so, the court suggested that § 3742(a) applies only when a defendant challenges a new or modified sentence. And that reasoning applied to the refusal to terminate supervised release:

Though an early termination motion may ultimately result in relief from a sentence, such a motion does not challenge or seek review of the validity of the sentence itself. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1). An appeal of a denial of an early termination motion is no doubt related to the final sentence, but a defendant in this context seeks review of the motion’s denial without taking a position on the validity of the initially imposed sentence. Because the district court did not impose a new or modified sentence, and because Tavarez does not ask us to review such a sentence, § 3742(a) does not “provide the basis or the criteria for reviewing” the Summary Order.

The rest of § 3742 reinforced this reading. So “§ 3724(a) by its terms is completely inapposite in a case where the district court denies a defendant’s motion to modify his sentence. What § 3742 plainly does, rather, is regulate from start to finish a circuit court’s review of sentences newly imposed by the district court.” (Quotation marks omitted.)

The Sixth Circuit added that its decision in United States v. Marshall did not foreclose the appeal. Marshall held only that 28 U.S.C. § 1291 “provides subject-matter jurisdiction over an appeal from a district court’s denial of an early termination motion.” (See this prior roundup for more on Marshall.) The case did not resolve whether § 3742(a) barred review.

United States v. Tavarez, 2025 WL 1733386 (6th Cir. June 23, 2025), available at the Sixth Circuit and Westlaw

No Immediate Appeals for Denials of Geneva Convention Mixed-Medical-Commissions

In Al-Baluchi v. Hegseth, the D.C. Circuit held that habeas petitioner detained in Guantánamo Bay could not immediately appeal from the denial of a Mixed Medical Commission.

“[T]he Third Geneva Convention provides that parties to a conflict must generally ‘send back to their own country’ any ‘seriously wounded and seriously sick prisoners of war.’” To that end, both the Convention and domestic law “call[] for the appointment of ‘Mixed Medical Commissions’ to assess whether a prisoner of war is eligible for repatriation.”

The petitioner in Al-Baluchi has been detained at Guantánamo Bay since 2006. He filed a habeas petition, which was stayed once the government convened a military commission to try him. Several years later, the petitioner moved to compel the convention of a Mixed Medical Commission. The petitioner argued that years of torture and his lengthy detention have caused serious neurological issues that qualify him for repatriation. The district court denied this request, concluding that “a detainee captured during a noninternational armed conflict, like [the petitioner], is not entitled to a Mixed Medical Commission examination.” The petitioner then appealed to the D.C. Circuit.

The D.C. Circuit dismissed the appeal for a lack of jurisdiction. The petitioner proffered two potential grounds for appellate jurisdiction: the order was an effective denial of an injunction (appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1)), or the order was appealable via the collateral-order doctrine. The D.C. Circuit analyzed these together, as either required “a showing of serious or irreparable harm requiring immediate review.” And the petitioner could not show sufficient harm. That’s because the ultimate repatriation decision was discretionary. So even if a Mixed Medical Commission deemed the petitioner eligible for repatriation, the government would not have to immediately repatriate him.

The D.C. Circuit ended its opinion by noting that it was not deciding any other potential theory of irreparable injury:

We do not address whether we would have appellate jurisdiction under a different theory of irreparable injury. Al-Baluchi does not argue, for instance, that a favorable repatriation determination by a Mixed Medical Commission could prompt the government to consent to his repatriation even while his prosecution is pending. Nor does al-Baluchi offer any other theory as to how immediate review (and the ability to undergo examination before final judgment instead of after) might accelerate his potential repatriation. And although al-Baluchi suggested at oral argument that a Mixed Medical Commission could also require adjustments to his medical treatment at Guantánamo Bay, he has forfeited this theory by failing to raise it in his briefs.

Al-Baluchi v. Hegseth, 2025 WL 1689359 (D.C. Cir. June 17, 2025), available at the D.C. Circuit and Westlaw

The Month’s Improper Qualified-Immunity Appeals

Here are last month’s improper, fact-based qualified-immunity appeals:

There was also Teetz ex rel. Lofton v. Stepien, a Tenth Circuit affirmance of the denial of qualified immunity, in which the defendants invoked the blatant-contradiction exception. The court held that the exception did not apply, as neither a video nor medical-expert testimony satisfied the exception. The evidence was instead consistent with the plaintiff’s version of events. The Tenth Circuit went on to review—and-affirm—the immunity denial on the proper factual basis.

Teetz as next friend of Lofton v. Stepien, 2025 WL 1728527 (10th Cir. June 23, 2025), available at the Tenth Circuit and Westlaw

Quick Notes

In In re Amgen Inc., the Third Circuit joined the Ninth Circuit in holding that discovery order entered under 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) is not final or appealable when the district court has not yet definitively resolved the scope of discovery.

In re Amgen Inc., 2025 WL 1585165 (3d Cir. June 5, 2025), available at the Third Circuit and Westlaw

In Tennessee Conference of NAACP v. Lee, the Sixth Circuit reviewed an organization’s standing to bring suit as part of a preliminary-injunction appeal. The court explained that it could do so because appellate jurisdiction extended to “all decisions that underlie the district court’s injunction.” (Quotation marks omitted.)

Tennessee Conference of NAACP v. Lee, 2025 WL 1587965 (6th Cir. June 5, 2025), available at the Sixth Circuit and Westlaw

In United States v. Peck, the Tenth Circuit held that the government could appeal from an order that resolved an ancillary proceeding related to third-party interests in forfeitable property. The district court had determined that a third party held title to a piece of land, such that the government could not obtain that land through forfeiture. So the order left nothing to be decided in the district court. And although the proceeding stemmed from a criminal case, it was civil in nature. The limits on the government’s power to appeal in criminal cases therefore did not apply.

United States v. Peck, 2025 WL 1635609 (10th Cir. June 10, 2025), available at the Tenth Circuit and Westlaw

In McGhee-Twilley v. CoreCivic of Tennessee, LLC, the Sixth Circuit noted that when it lacks appellate jurisdiction, it cannot remand the case with directions or instructions to the district court. Lacking jurisdiction, the court of appeals must dismiss the appeal itself.

McGhee-Twilley v. Corecivic of Tennessee, LLC, 2025 WL 1628481 (6th Cir. June 9, 2025), available at the Sixth Circuit and Westlaw

In Doe v. G6 Hospitality LLC, the Eleventh Circuit vacated a partial judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) and accordingly dismissed the appeal. The district court’s desire to avoid duplicative discovery and avoiding hardship to the plaintiff (a victim of sex trafficking) were insufficient to warrant an immediate appeal.

Doe v. G6 Hospitality LLC, 2025 WL 1794419 (11th Cir. June 30, 2025), available at the Eleventh Circuit and Westlaw

In United States v. Burgos-Montes, the First Circuit held that it could review the without-prejudice denial of a motion for compassionate release. Although the district court said the defendant could file another motion, the court had ruled on the merits of his filed motion. And there was no further work for the court to do—even a subsequent motion would not “resuscitate” the earlier motion.

United States v. Burgos-Montes, 2025 WL 1793013 (1st Cir. June 30, 2025), available at the First Circuit and Westlaw

And in Maney v. Oregon, the Ninth Circuit said that it lacked jurisdiction to review the plaintiffs’ standing in an appeal from the denial of qualified immunity.

Maney v. Oregon, 2025 WL 1794110 (9th Cir. June 30, 2025), available at the Ninth Circuit and Westlaw

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