Appealing CAFA Remands via § 1291
In Cheapside Minerals, Ltd. v. Devon Energy Production Co., the Fifth Circuit held that a remand under the Class Action Fairness Act’s local-controversy rule was an appealable final decision under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. That meant the appellant did not need to resort to a discretionary appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c).
The Remand in Cheapside Minerals
Cheapside Minerals stemmed from a dispute over oil-and-gas royalties. The plaintiffs filed a class-action in Texas state court, which the defendant removed to federal court. The district court subsequently remanded the action to state court, concluding that the case fell under the “local controversy” exception to the Class Action Fairness Act. The defendant then sought review by the Fifth Circuit.
§ 1447(d)’s Limit on Remand Appeals
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d), many remand decisions are not reviewable. But not all; the rule has exceptions. One exception comes from the Class Action Fairness Act. 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c) provides that, notwithstanding § 1447(d), aggrieved litigants can petition a court of appeals for permission to appeal an order remanding a case that was removed under the Act.
Moreover, § 1447(d) does not apply to all remands. The Supreme Court has held that § 1447(d) must be read in the context of the rest of § 1447. So in Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermandsdorfer, the Court held that § 1447(d)’s prohibition on remand appeals applies only to remands authorized by the neighboring § 1447(c). And § 1447(c) authorizes remands due to either a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction or a procedural defect in removal. So if a district court remands an action for some other reason, § 1447(d) does not bar an appeal. And so long as the remand marked the end of the action, the remand can be reviewed via 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
Local-Controversy Remands & § 1291
Given the scope of § 1447(d), the Fifth Circuit held that orders remanding cases removed under the Class Action Fairness Act are appealable final decisions so long as the remand was not due to a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction or a defect in removal. And a remand under the local-controversy exception is neither. It’s instead an abstention-based remand. And § 1447(d) does not bar review of abstention-based remands. The remand was thus an appealable final decision under § 1291.
Cheapside Minerals, Ltd. v. Devon Energy Production Co., 2024 WL 886951 (5th Cir. Mar. 1, 2024), available at the Fifth Circuit and Westlaw
Final Decisions PLLC is an appellate boutique and consultancy that focuses on federal appellate jurisdiction. We partner with lawyers facing appellate-jurisdiction issues, working as consultants or co-counsel to achieve positive outcomes on appeal. Contact us to learn how we can work together.
Learn More ContactRelated Posts
Robert H. Klonoff has posted a draft of his new article Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f): Reflections After a Quarter Century. The article includes new empirical data on appeals (and attempts to appeal) under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f) and updates my study from a few years ago. It also includes an analysis […]
Continue reading....
The Fourth Circuit split on whether it could review the denial of a motion to dismiss alongside a Rule 23(f) class-certification appeal.
Continue reading....
In National ATM Council, Inc. v. Visa, Inc., the D.C. Circuit offered a rare explanation for granting a petition to appeal a class-certification grant under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f). The reasons given were particularly interesting.
Continue reading....
In Harris v. Medical Transportation Management, Inc., the D.C. Circuit reviewed (and reversed) a grant of class certification. But it refused to use pendent appellate jurisdiction to review certification of a collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act. The court explained that class actions and collective actions “are fundamentally different creatures.” The court of […]
Continue reading....
The Class Action Fairness Act (often referred to as “CAFA”) permits the removal of certain class actions brought in state court. CAFA includes a special appellate provision—28 U.S.C. § 1453(c)(1)—which gives the courts of appeals discretion to review a district court order “granting or denying a motion to remand a class action to the State court […]
Continue reading....Recent Posts
This month’s roundup features two decisions on litigants’ attempts to voluntarily dismiss some of their claims. In one, a defendant filed a written, pretrial notice that it abandoned one of its counterclaims. In another, the parties stipulated to a dismissal, but one defendant did not sign the stipulation. In both cases, the court deemed the […]
Continue reading....
In Gessele v. Jack in the Box Inc., the Ninth Circuit held that when a district court alters its judgment by granting a post-judgment motion, the time to appeal runs from the entry of an amended judgment. Unlike orders denying post-judgment motions, the appeal clock does not start with the order itself.
Continue reading....
In Simmons v. USI Insurance LLC, the Eleventh Circuit held that the purported abandonment of a counterclaim before trial was ineffective and thus precluded appellate jurisdiction. The counterclaim was the only theory of relief that had not been resolved at summary judgment or trial. And in a written notice before trial, the defendant had said […]
Continue reading....
September’s biggest development in federal appellate jurisdiction concerned appeals from denials of anti-SLAPP motions under California law. The Ninth Circuit overruled its longstanding rule that defendants can immediately appeal from these denials via the collateral-order doctrine. But only a week later, the Federal Circuit followed that now-overruled caselaw and heard an anti-SLAPP appeal. It will […]
Continue reading....
Last month saw the Ninth Circuit apply its rule that a minute order can count as a separate document for purposes of starting the appeal clock. The Sixth Circuit explained when it cannot review contract-formation issues in an arbitration appeal. And the Fourth Circuit declined to exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction over standing and ripeness issues […]
Continue reading....