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In Industrial Services Group, Inc. v. Dobson, the Fourth Circuit gave a convincing explanation for why pendent appellate jurisdiction does not extend to standing in a sovereign-immunity appeal. The courts of appeals have split on this specific issue, and the caselaw is mixed on whether standing is part of other interlocutory appeals.…

In Makozy, v. Westcor Land Title, the Eleventh Circuit tackled a particularly complicated issue of appellate timing that involved the interaction between Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(4) and Rule 4(a)(7). Simplifying as much as possible (which isn’t much), the case asked if a post-judgment motion could shorten the 150 day period for entry of a judgment when the district court doesn’t set out the judgment in a separate document.…

Earlier this year, the Eleventh Circuit reiterated its rule that litigants cannot voluntarily dismiss individual claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1). That portion of the rule permits plaintiffs to voluntarily dismiss “an action without a court order.” So plaintiffs can dismiss only entire actions under Rule 41(a)(1), and attempts to dismiss individual claims are ineffective.…

The two main events in April were probably the Sixth Circuit’s potential expansion of Microsoft Corp. v. Baker and oral argument in the Supreme Court case on preserving issues raised in denied summary-judgment motions.

But there were several other decisions of note. Two courts addressed class-certification appeals under Rule 23(f)—one explaining the standards for granting Rule 23(f) petitions and another holding that it can address standing in those appeals.…

In Ohio Public Employees Retirement System v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp., the Sixth Circuit held that an invited summary-judgment decision was not final because the plaintiff was trying to circumvent Rule 23(f). The district court had denied class certification. The plaintiff then tried to manufacture a final, appealable decision by asking the district court to enter judgment against it.…

The highlight from last month is probably the Second Circuit’s conclusion that it did not need to address its own jurisdiction when the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. The decision was an immense, erroneous, and very likely unintentional expansion of federal appellate jurisdiction.

There was also a fascinating D.C. Circuit decision on what it means to be a “party” when appealing discovery orders directed at others.…

In LeChase Construction Services, LLC v. Argonaut Insurance Co., the Second Circuit held that 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d)’s bar on remand appeals applied to remands under § 1447(e). But the court also held that it could review a remand that, while purportedly under § 1447(e), was actually based on “a patently nonjurisdictional ground, such as prudential considerations.”…

In Broidy Capital Management LLC v. Muzin, the D.C. Circuit dismissed a non-party’s appeal that challenged a discovery order directed to a party. The court explained that only those with some sort of party status—whether an original party, an intervenor, or some other type of “party” for purposes of appeal—may appeal.…

In Solomon v. St. Joseph Hospital, the Second Circuit skipped over appellate-jurisdiction issues to address the district court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. On its face, the opinion suggests that litigants can take interlocutory appeals to challenge federal subject-matter jurisdiction. This would be a massive—and likely inadvertent—expansion of interlocutory appeals.…

In Fraga v. Premium Retail Services, Inc., the First Circuit reviewed what was nominally the denial of a motion to dismiss, as that motion effectively sought to compel arbitration.…