In a subsequent appeal from the same action, the Sixth Circuit vacated a prior panel decision after concluding that the panel lacked appellate jurisdiction.


In RJ Control Consultants, Inc. v. Multiject, LLC, the Sixth Circuit held that it lacked appellate jurisdiction over a prior appeal in an action. The court accordingly vacated the prior panel’s decision.

I don’t think I’ve ever seen this before. And while it might be an okay practice in appeals from the same action (though I have doubts), I don’t think appellate panels should—indeed, can—inquire into jurisdiction in prior decisions.

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The Seventh Circuit suggested that an invocation of federal-officer removal—which permitted a plenary appeal from a remand order—was frivolous and thus sanctionable.


In Roberts v. Smith & Wesson Brands, Inc., the Seventh Circuit affirmed a district court order remanding an action to state court. Although remand orders are generally not reviewable on appeal, the defendants in Roberts had invoked federal-officer removal and thus could obtain plenary review. But the Seventh Circuit seemed to think that this invocation of federal-officer removal was frivolous. The court accordingly suggested that the district court consider ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiffs’ fees and costs.

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The Eleventh Circuit held that a bankruptcy court order order recognizing a foreign proceeding is final.


In In re Al Zawawi, the Eleventh Circuit held that a bankruptcy court order recognizing a foreign proceeding is final and thus appealable.

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The First Circuit applied the civil-appeal deadline to a criminal defense attorney's appeal from a disqualification order.


In Amador v. United States, the First Circuit held that the civil-appeal deadline applied to a criminal defense attorney’s appeal from a disqualification order. The court reasoned that the appeal did not involve the underlying conviction or sentence, nor was the appeal brought on behalf of the defendant. The appeal was thus collateral to the criminal prosecution, and the civil-appeal deadline applied.

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Reviewing hardship determinations in immigration appeals, reconsidering motions-panel decisions, church-autonomy appeals, CAFA remands, pendent appellate jurisdiction in Rule 23(f) appeals, and much more.


March was a busy month. Let’s start with the Supreme Court’s decision holding that appellate courts had jurisdiction to review hardship determinations in immigration appeals.

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The Ninth Circuit provided another outdated discussion of Rule 3(c) and the order-designation requirement, overlooking the 2021 amendments to that rule.


In T.A. ex rel. Harmandjian v. County of Los Angeles, the Ninth Circuit determined that a notice of appeal designating the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion was sufficient to appeal the underlying judgment.

The decision was correct. But the discussion was entirely off point. Like several courts before it, the Ninth Circuit failed to recognize that Rule 3(c) was amended in 2021. And those amendments expressly address the situation in which a party designates only a post-judgment motion.

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The Second Circuit held that interlocutory orders do not merge into a final judgment when the action was dismissed as a discovery sanction.


Courts have long held that the merger doctrine does not apply when an action is dismissed for a failure to prosecute. In Marquez v. Silver, the Second Circuit extended this holding to actions dismissed as a discovery sanction. The court explained that sanction dismissals carry the same risk of strategic behavior as failure-to-prosecute dismissals. The court also noted that if the sanction dismissal was proper, any errors in the district court’s other decisions are irrelevant.

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A divided Eighth Circuit held that a merits panel could review a motions panel’s denial of a motion to dismiss an appeal. The court went on to hold that a purported Rule 59(e) motion did not reset the appeal clock.


In Nordgren v. Hennepin County, a divided Eight Circuit held that a merits panel could reexamine a motions-panel decision on appellate jurisdiction. The majority went on to hold that a post-judgment motion—though titled a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e)—was not really a Rule 59(e) motion and thus did not reset the appeal clock.

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A divided Seventh Circuit held that defendants cannot immediately appeal rejections of the church-autonomy defense.


In Garrick v. Moody Bible Institute, a divided Seventh Circuit held that a defendant cannot immediately appeal from the denial of a motion to dismiss on church-autonomy grounds. The Seventh Circuit thereby joined the Second and Tenth Circuits in both its ultimate holding and its having a split court.

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The Fourth Circuit made the widely accepted (yet often implicit) point that a notice of appeal must come after the decision a litigant wants to appeal.


Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1) says that a notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days after entry of the judgment or order appealed from. Taken literally, Rule 4 might permit notices of appeal filed before the district court ever makes a decision. After all, that point in time is before—perhaps well before—30 days after the decision.

But courts don’t read the rule literally. They instead require that the notice be filed between the appealed decision and the expiration of the time to appeal. So in Wall Guy, Inc. v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., the Fourth Circuit dismissed an appeal that was filed before the appealed decision.

The decision illustrates the difference between two kinds of premature notices of appeal. Sometimes notices are filed after the appealed decision but before the entry of a judgment. Courts frequently relate those notices forward to entry of the judgment using the doctrine of cumulative finality. But a notice filed before the appealed decision is irredeemably premature.

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