A divided Seventh Circuit held that defendants cannot immediately appeal rejections of the church-autonomy defense.
March 25, 2024
In Garrick v. Moody Bible Institute, a divided Seventh Circuit held that a defendant cannot immediately appeal from the denial of a motion to dismiss on church-autonomy grounds. The Seventh Circuit thereby joined the Second and Tenth Circuits in both its ultimate holding and its having a split court.
The Fourth Circuit made the widely accepted (yet often implicit) point that a notice of appeal must come after the decision a litigant wants to appeal.
March 20, 2024
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1) says that a notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days after entry of the judgment or order appealed from. Taken literally, Rule 4 might permit notices of appeal filed before the district court ever makes a decision. After all, that point in time is before—perhaps well before—30 days after the decision.
But courts don’t read the rule literally. They instead require that the notice be filed between the appealed decision and the expiration of the time to appeal. So in Wall Guy, Inc. v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., the Fourth Circuit dismissed an appeal that was filed before the appealed decision.
The decision illustrates the difference between two kinds of premature notices of appeal. Sometimes notices are filed after the appealed decision but before the entry of a judgment. Courts frequently relate those notices forward to entry of the judgment using the doctrine of cumulative finality. But a notice filed before the appealed decision is irredeemably premature.
The Fifth Circuit held that the grant of a Rule 59(e) motion that resolved an ambiguity in the original judgment allowed a second Rule 59(e) motion to reset the appeal clock.
March 20, 2024
In Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB v. Myers, the Fifth Circuit held that the grant of a Rule 59(e) motion results in a new judgment, such that a second Rule 59(e) motion reset the appeal clock. The decision illustrates the seemingly rare scenario in which a subsequent post-judgment motion can extend the time to appeal.
The Supreme Court held that courts of appeals have jurisdiction to review hardship determinations in immigration appeals. But several justices doubted that this was Congress’s intent.
March 20, 2024
In Wilkinson v. Garland, the Supreme Court held that courts of appeals could review whether an immigration petitioner had shown the hardship necessary to be eligible for cancellation of removal. The majority thought that this holding was a straightforward extension of 2020’s Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr. But several justices doubted that Congress intended for such a board scope of review in immigration appeals.
In two recent appeals, courts held that a purported final judgment was defective—and no final decision existed—due to unresolved crossclaims.
March 18, 2024
The classic definition of a “final decision” is one that ends litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the district court to do but enforce the judgment. So when a district court enters what it calls a “final judgment” and closes a case, it would seem that a final decision exists. But what if the district court (and the parties) have overlooked one or more claims?
In two recent cases—Shipman v. Aquatherm L.P. and Amerisure Insurance Co. v. Auchter Co.—courts of appeals held that the existence of unresolved crossclaims precluded a final decision, despite the district court’s entry of a judgment.
The First Circuit held that it could review a decisions made before a § 3605 transfer so long as the appeal came before the transfer was docketed.
March 18, 2024
In United States v. Sastrom, the First Circuit held that it could review a supervised-release order despite the transfer of a criminal defendant’s case to another, out-of-circuit district. The transfer in Sastrom was under 18 U.S.C. § 3605. And the First Circuit treated this transfer the same as those under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a): so long as the appeal comes before the transfer is docketed, appellate jurisdiction exists.
The Fourth Circuit split on whether it could review the denial of a motion to dismiss alongside a Rule 23(f) class-certification appeal.
March 18, 2024
In Elegant Massage, LLC v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., a divided Fourth Circuit reviewed—and reversed—the denial of a motion dismiss while hearing a class-certification appeal under Rule 23(f). The majority thought it could do so because the class-certification and motion-to-dismiss decisions were “so interconnected as to require concurrent review.” Judge Wynn dissented in part, contending that class certification could easily be reviewed without delving into the dismissal motion.
The Fifth Circuit held that litigants can use § 1291 (and not a discretionary appeal under § 1453(c)) to appeal remands under CAFA’s local-controversy exception.
March 18, 2024
In Cheapside Minerals, Ltd. v. Devon Energy Production Co., the Fifth Circuit held that a remand under the Class Action Fairness Act’s local-controversy rule was an appealable final decision under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. That meant the appellant did not need to resort to a discretionary appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c).
Some questions about the collateral-order doctrine. Plus hindsight regarding the appeal deadline, admiralty appeals, and much more.
March 9, 2024
Decisions from last month raised some interesting questions about the role of the collateral-order doctrine, particularly when it comes to immunities and criminal appeals. In other developments, the Eleventh Circuit deemed an appeal untimely after concluding that—in hindsight—a post-judgment motion was not really a Rule 59 motion. The Ninth Circuit split on what it means to determine “rights and liabilities” for purposes of admiralty appeals. And the Fifth Circuit heard another governmental-privilege appeal. Plus appeals from reinstated removal orders, improper qualified-immunity appeals, and more.
The Eleventh Circuit held that, in hindsight, a post-judgment motion was not really a Rule 59 motion and thus did not reset the appeal clock.
March 9, 2024
A motion to alter or amend a judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) normally resets the appeal deadline. But in SEC v. TCA Fund Management Group, the Eleventh Circuit held that a post-judgment motion was not really a Rule 59 motion. That means the motion did not reset the appeal deadline, and the notice of appeal was late.
This is a rough way to treat post-judgment motion. The appellants in TCA Fund Management likely relied on their motion—which was styled a Rule 59 motion—when determining the time to appeal. I don’t see a good reason for a court of appeals to say, in hindsight, that a motion was inadequate and thus did not reset the appeal deadline. The time to appeal should be—above all—clear. Appellate courts’ second guessing of post-judgment motions injects uncertainty into determining the appeal deadline. It also opens the door to appellees’ arguing that a post-judgment motion didn’t count for purposes of resetting the appeal deadline.