Reviewing hardship determinations in immigration appeals, reconsidering motions-panel decisions, church-autonomy appeals, CAFA remands, pendent appellate jurisdiction in Rule 23(f) appeals, and much more.
April 3, 2024
March was a busy month. Let’s start with the Supreme Court’s decision holding that appellate courts had jurisdiction to review hardship determinations in immigration appeals.
The Ninth Circuit provided another outdated discussion of Rule 3(c) and the order-designation requirement, overlooking the 2021 amendments to that rule.
March 29, 2024
In T.A. ex rel. Harmandjian v. County of Los Angeles, the Ninth Circuit determined that a notice of appeal designating the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion was sufficient to appeal the underlying judgment.
The decision was correct. But the discussion was entirely off point. Like several courts before it, the Ninth Circuit failed to recognize that Rule 3(c) was amended in 2021. And those amendments expressly address the situation in which a party designates only a post-judgment motion.
The Second Circuit held that interlocutory orders do not merge into a final judgment when the action was dismissed as a discovery sanction.
March 28, 2024
Courts have long held that the merger doctrine does not apply when an action is dismissed for a failure to prosecute. In Marquez v. Silver, the Second Circuit extended this holding to actions dismissed as a discovery sanction. The court explained that sanction dismissals carry the same risk of strategic behavior as failure-to-prosecute dismissals. The court also noted that if the sanction dismissal was proper, any errors in the district court’s other decisions are irrelevant.
A divided Eighth Circuit held that a merits panel could review a motions panel’s denial of a motion to dismiss an appeal. The court went on to hold that a purported Rule 59(e) motion did not reset the appeal clock.
March 27, 2024
In Nordgren v. Hennepin County, a divided Eight Circuit held that a merits panel could reexamine a motions-panel decision on appellate jurisdiction. The majority went on to hold that a post-judgment motion—though titled a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e)—was not really a Rule 59(e) motion and thus did not reset the appeal clock.
A divided Seventh Circuit held that defendants cannot immediately appeal rejections of the church-autonomy defense.
March 25, 2024
In Garrick v. Moody Bible Institute, a divided Seventh Circuit held that a defendant cannot immediately appeal from the denial of a motion to dismiss on church-autonomy grounds. The Seventh Circuit thereby joined the Second and Tenth Circuits in both its ultimate holding and its having a split court.
The Fourth Circuit made the widely accepted (yet often implicit) point that a notice of appeal must come after the decision a litigant wants to appeal.
March 20, 2024
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1) says that a notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days after entry of the judgment or order appealed from. Taken literally, Rule 4 might permit notices of appeal filed before the district court ever makes a decision. After all, that point in time is before—perhaps well before—30 days after the decision.
But courts don’t read the rule literally. They instead require that the notice be filed between the appealed decision and the expiration of the time to appeal. So in Wall Guy, Inc. v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., the Fourth Circuit dismissed an appeal that was filed before the appealed decision.
The decision illustrates the difference between two kinds of premature notices of appeal. Sometimes notices are filed after the appealed decision but before the entry of a judgment. Courts frequently relate those notices forward to entry of the judgment using the doctrine of cumulative finality. But a notice filed before the appealed decision is irredeemably premature.
The Fifth Circuit held that the grant of a Rule 59(e) motion that resolved an ambiguity in the original judgment allowed a second Rule 59(e) motion to reset the appeal clock.
March 20, 2024
In Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB v. Myers, the Fifth Circuit held that the grant of a Rule 59(e) motion results in a new judgment, such that a second Rule 59(e) motion reset the appeal clock. The decision illustrates the seemingly rare scenario in which a subsequent post-judgment motion can extend the time to appeal.
The Supreme Court held that courts of appeals have jurisdiction to review hardship determinations in immigration appeals. But several justices doubted that this was Congress’s intent.
March 20, 2024
In Wilkinson v. Garland, the Supreme Court held that courts of appeals could review whether an immigration petitioner had shown the hardship necessary to be eligible for cancellation of removal. The majority thought that this holding was a straightforward extension of 2020’s Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr. But several justices doubted that Congress intended for such a board scope of review in immigration appeals.
In two recent appeals, courts held that a purported final judgment was defective—and no final decision existed—due to unresolved crossclaims.
March 18, 2024
The classic definition of a “final decision” is one that ends litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the district court to do but enforce the judgment. So when a district court enters what it calls a “final judgment” and closes a case, it would seem that a final decision exists. But what if the district court (and the parties) have overlooked one or more claims?
In two recent cases—Shipman v. Aquatherm L.P. and Amerisure Insurance Co. v. Auchter Co.—courts of appeals held that the existence of unresolved crossclaims precluded a final decision, despite the district court’s entry of a judgment.
The First Circuit held that it could review a decisions made before a § 3605 transfer so long as the appeal came before the transfer was docketed.
March 18, 2024
In United States v. Sastrom, the First Circuit held that it could review a supervised-release order despite the transfer of a criminal defendant’s case to another, out-of-circuit district. The transfer in Sastrom was under 18 U.S.C. § 3605. And the First Circuit treated this transfer the same as those under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a): so long as the appeal comes before the transfer is docketed, appellate jurisdiction exists.