Posts in category “Appellate Decisions”
In United States v. 60 Automotive Grilles, the Eleventh Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to immediately review a decision denying intervention as of right. That was because the district court correctly denied intervention. Practically speaking, the court reviewed and affirmed the district court’s decision. But under the “anomalous rule” that the Eleventh Circuit and other courts apply, appellate jurisdiction in intervention appeals turns on whether the district court correctly denied intervention.
This anomalous rule is one of a few different rules that the circuits use to govern intervention appeals. All of these rules reach the same practical outcome: would-be intervenors can obtain immediate appellate review of decisions denying intervention. The rules differ only in how courts describe the review. And the differences are unnecessary and potentially confusing. It might be far simpler to say that all denials of intervention (or at least all denials of intervention as of right) are immediately appealable, regardless of whether the district court was correct.
In In re Williams-Sonoma, Inc., a district court had ordered a defendant to produce a list of its customers so opposing counsel could identify a lead plaintiff to pursue a class action. A split panel of the Ninth Circuit concluded that this discovery order was clearly erroneous and warranted reversal via mandamus.
In Williams v. Catoe, the en banc Fifth Circuit held that orders denying appointed counsel in § 1983 suits are not immediately appealable via the collateral-order doctrine. The court concluded that these orders were effectively reviewable in an appeal from a final judgment. In doing so, the Fifth Circuit overruled its decision in Robbins v. Maggio and joined nearly every other circuit to address this matter. It appears that only the Eighth Circuit remains in treating orders denying appointed counsel as immediately appealable.
In last week’s Henson v. Fidelity National Financial, Inc., the Ninth Circuit held that plaintiffs could use Rule 60(b)(6) to undo voluntary dismissals they had entered to facilitate appellate review. Before the Supreme Court’s decision in Microsoft Corp. v. Baker, the Ninth Circuit allowed plaintiffs had to use these dismissals to secure review of orders denying class certification. Baker closed that door to appeal. But Henson—which was pending on appeal when Baker was decided—held that plaintiffs who had relied on pre-Baker caselaw in voluntarily dismissing their claims could obtain relief from the judgment via Rule 60(b).
In Vergara v. City of Chicago, the Seventh Circuit untangled a procedural mess involving multiple missed deadlines. The notice of appeal was late (though understandably so), as was the objection to the late notice. But none of these missed deadlines went to the court’s jurisdiction. They were claims-processing rules—one mandatory but not properly invoked, the other not mandatory and forfeited.
All of this could have been avoided had the district court not waited almost two years after dismissing the action to issue its opinion. Like last year’s Walker v. Weatherspoon, Vergara illustrates the potential for mistakes when district courts decide a case but don’t issue an opinion until after the time for appealing has run. It also illustrates the need to better define the point in litigation when parties have a right—and a limited window of time—to take the traditional, end-of-proceedings appeal.
In Sprint Nextel Corp. v. Wireless Buybacks Holdings, LLC, the Fourth Circuit addressed one of Sprint’s suits against cell-phone arbitrageurs. But before reaching the merits, the court had to assure itself of its jurisdiction. After the district court had granted partial summary judgment to Sprint on liability, the parties stipulated to the amount of damages and the defendant appealed. But consented judgments like this can create problems with appellate jurisdiction. And Wireless Buybacks provides a helpful explanation of the issue.
In last week’s Stallworth v. Bryant, the Fifth Circuit allowed Mississippi legislators to appeal a discovery order that rejected their claim of legislative privilege. It appears that those legislators were never held in contempt. This is odd; litigants normally must first be held in contempt for disobeying a discovery order before they can appeal it. But a little digging showed that appellate jurisdiction came from a line of (relatively old) Fifth Circuit decisions that allow immediate appeals from denials of governmental privileges.
These older Fifth Circuit decisions are questionable. Actually, I think they’re wrong—wrong when they were decided and particularly wrong since Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter.
Update: The Fifth Circuit granted rehearing en banc, and argument is scheduled for January 23, 2020.
I’ve jokingly characterized the Supreme Court’s decision in Microsoft v. Baker as creating a zombie action: one that is over in the district court but not final—and never will be final—for purposes of appeal. (The joke kills at cocktail parties.) This oddity is made possible by building most of the rules for federal appellate jurisdiction on interpretations of the term “final decisions.” Sometimes oddities like this produce pragmatically sound outcomes. The ultimate decision in Baker, for example, made practical sense.
Now the Fifth Circuit has created another zombie action—Williams v. Taylor Seidenbach, Inc. And this one makes zero sense. It’s absurd. And it needs to be reversed en banc.
In Koh v. Ustich, the Seventh Circuit dismissed a qualified-immunity appeal because all of the defendants’ arguments disputed the version of facts assumed by the district court. It was an undoubtedly correct decision. But the appeal appears to be another unfortunate example of imposing unnecessary delay and expense on plaintiffs’ civil rights claims for no good reason. This can happen because the law governing qualified-immunity appeals is not conducive to early screening of improper appeals.
In King v. LeBlanc, the Fifth Circuit dismissed a qualified-immunity appeal that challenged only the district court’s determination that a genuine fact issue existed as to the officer’s deliberate indifference. This far-too-common practice of challenging the facts in qualified-immunity appeals wastes a lot of time for courts and plaintiffs. In King, the Fifth Circuit was quick to remind defendants that it lacks jurisdiction over these arguments. But are reminders enough?
Final Decisions PLLC is an appellate boutique and consultancy that focuses on federal appellate jurisdiction. We partner with lawyers facing appellate-jurisdiction issues, working as consultants or co-counsel to achieve positive outcomes on appeal. Contact us to learn how we can work together.
Learn More Contact