Resetting the appeal clock, dismissals after ordering arbitration, successive injunctions, and more.
December 9, 2024
November saw a pair of interesting decisions on the application of Smith v. Spizzirri as well as a formal standard for successive injunction appeals in the Tenth Circuit. But let’s start with a decision on whether a post-judgment motion to reconsider reset the appeal clock.
- The Sixth Circuit on Post-Judgment Motions that Don’t Reset the Appeal Clock
- Applying Smith v. Spizzirri
- The Tenth Circuit’s Standard on Successive Injunction Appeals
- The Fifth Circuit Heard Another Governmental-Privilege Appeal
- Cert Petition the Eleventh Circuit’s Both-Questions Rule for Qualified-Immunity Appeals
- The Month’s Improper Qualified-Immunity Appeals
- Quick Notes
The Sixth Circuit on Post-Judgment Motions that Don’t Reset the Appeal Clock
Disclosure: I consulted on the plaintiff’s motion to reconsider this decision.
In Miller v. William Beaumont Hospital, the Sixth Circuit held that a post-judgment motion for reconsideration did not reset the appeal clock because the motion did not invoke Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). The plaintiff had relied on an abrogated local rule that authorized motions for reconsideration. According to the Sixth Circuit, reliance on the local rule prevented the motion from being one under Rule 59(e). So the motion for reconsideration did not reset the appeal time, making the plaintiff’s appeal from the merits decision untimely.
After the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant in Miller, the plaintiff filed a motion titled “Motion for Reconsideration.” The body of the motion relied on an old version of Eastern District of Michigan Local Rule 7.1(h). Until 2021, that rule authorized motions for reconsideration of a judgment or order. But after recent amendments, the local rule now says that “[p]arties seeking reconsideration of final orders or judgments must file a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) or 60(b). The court will not grant reconsideration of such an order or judgment under this rule.” The district court denied the motion for failing to cite to Rules 59(e) or 60(b). The plaintiff then appealed.
If the appeal clock began running at the summary-judgment decision, the plaintiff’s appeal was late. But Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1) resets the appeal clock if a party files a timely motion under (among other provisions) Rule 59(e). The question, then, was whether the plaintiff’s motion qualified as one under Rule 59(e).
The Sixth Circuit held that it didn’t. Although prior Sixth Circuit decisions had treated motions under the old Local Rule 7.1(h) as a Rule 59(e) motion, the court would no longer do so. That’s because the current Local Rule 7.1(h) no longer authorizes relief similar to that available under Rule 59(e). According to the court, the current local rule prevents the Sixth Circuit from construing the motion as one under Rule 59(e).
There are several problems with this decision, which the plaintiff has pointed out in a motion to reconsider. Briefly, cases from the Sixth Circuit and elsewhere hold that the substance of post-judgment motions—not their styling—is what matters. Courts of appeals have accordingly treated motions as if they were brought under Rule 59(e) even though the motion did not cite that rule. Indeed, courts have held that motions reset the appeal deadline despite citing to the wrong rule.
More to the point, the plaintiff’s motion in Miller was effectively a Rule 59(e) motion. Granted, it cited to the wrong rule. But it sought the relief that Rule 59(e) authorizes. And the standard it invoked (that under the abrogated local rule) was little different than the standard courts apply to Rule 59(e) motions.
Finally, there is a general rule of federal practice that motions to reconsider filed within the time to appeal reset the appeal clock. Nothing more was needed in Miller to make the appeal timely.
The error in Miller was minor, and no one was harmed by it. The Sixth Circuit should have treated the motion as one that reset the appeal deadline. Hopefully the court rethinks this decision.
Miller v. William Beaumont Hospital, 2024 WL 4719240 (6th Cir. Nov. 8, 2024), available at the Sixth Circuit and Westlaw
Applying Smith v. Spizzirri
Last term, the Supreme Court held in Smith v. Spizzirri that district courts ordering arbitration must stay—not dismiss—the action so long as a party requests a stay. The decision had consequences for appellate jurisdiction. A decision ordering arbitration and dismissing an action is immediately appealable. A decision ordering arbitration and staying an action is not.
Last month saw two courts of appeals address the implications of Spizzirri for appellate jurisdiction. And the decisions supported my suspicion that asking for a stay is still required to get one.
Declining to Review an Arbitration Grant + Dismissal
In Bazzi v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., the Ninth Circuit declined to review a district court order that granted arbitration and then dismissed an action.
The dismissal gave the Ninth Circuit appellate jurisdiction. So the court could hear the appeal. But the court declined to do so. Given Spizzirri, the district court erred in dismissing the action. And an immediate appeal would interfere with the Federal Arbitration Act’s purpose of moving disputes to arbitration as swiftly as possible.
So rather than review the merits, the Ninth Circuit vacated the decision and remanded the action for entry of a stay.
Reviewing a Dismissal When Nobody Asked for a Stay
Contrast Bazzi with National Casualty Co. v. Continental Insurance Co., in which the Seventh Circuit refused to vacate a dismissal.
Like the district court in Bazzi, the district court in National Casualty granted the defendant’s motion to compel arbitration and—at that defendant’s request—dismissed the action. On appeal, the defendant asked the Seventh Circuit to vacate the dismissal and direct the district court to instead issue a stay.
The Seventh Circuit saw some problems with this request. The defendant had sought the dismissal, and the defendant had not filed a cross appeal. But more fundamentally, the defendant had never asked for a stay. And Spizzirri seemed to say that a request was necessary for a stay to be required. So the district court did not err in dismissing the action.
Bazzi v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 2024 WL 4690125 (9th Cir. Nov. 6, 2024), available at the Ninth Circuit and Westlaw
National Casualty Co. v. Continental Insurance Co., 2024 WL 4866798 (7th Cir. Nov. 22, 2024), available at the Seventh Circuit and Westlaw
The Tenth Circuit’s Standard on Successive Injunction Appeals
In SEC v. Young, the Tenth Circuit held that it would hear a successive preliminary-injunction appeal only when there was a change in circumstances, evidence, or law since the prior motion.
The court explained that 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) carves out a narrow exception to the final-judgment rule. The statute accordingly must be construed narrowly. So “[w]hen a district court has denied a successive motion to modify a preliminary injunction—a motion that raises the same issues or raises issues that could have been raised in a prior motion—[the court will] exercise interlocutory jurisdiction only if there was a change in circumstances, evidence, or law since the prior motion.”
The successive motion in Young did not satisfy this standard. It raised arguments that the appellants could have made—and thus forfeited—in an earlier motion. And there was no change in circumstances, evidence, or law that would warrant a second look.
SEC v. Young, 121 F.4th 70 (10th Cir. Nov. 4, 2024), available at the Tenth Circuit and Westlaw
The Fifth Circuit Heard Another Governmental-Privilege Appeal
In Jones v. Reeves, the Fifth Circuit heard an appeal from a discovery order that rejected a claim of governmental privilege. But rather than decide the privilege issue, the court concluded that the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue.
I’ve already said quite a bit about the Fifth Circuit’s allowance of governmental-privilege appeals. No need to repeat it all here.
Jones v. Reeves, 121 F.4th 531 (5th Cir. Nov. 19, 2024), available at the Fifth Circuit and Westlaw
Cert Petition the Eleventh Circuit’s Both-Questions Rule for Qualified-Immunity Appeals
A new cert petition asks the Supreme Court to reject the Eleventh Circuit’s “both-questions” rule for qualified-immunity appeals. That rule (on which I’ve written here and recently filed an amicus brief criticizing) permits the Eleventh Circuit to review the genuineness of fact disputes in qualified-immunity appeals so long as the defendant also challenges the clarity of the alleged constitutional violation.
The case is Chisesi v. Hunady (and it appears to be a cross-petition for cert). The response is due December 13, 2024.
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Chisesi v. Hunady No. 24-538 (Nov. 8, 2024), available at the Supreme Court and Westlaw
The Month’s Improper Qualified-Immunity Appeals
Here are last month’s improper, fact-based qualified-immunity appeals:
- Griffin v. Fonda, 2024 WL 4763934 (2d Cir. Nov. 13, 2024), available at CourtListener and Westlaw
- Clerkley v. Holcomb, 2024 WL 4887389 (10th Cir. Nov. 26, 2024), available at the Tenth Circuit and Westlaw
Quick Notes
In In re Ruiz, the First Circuit held that it could immediately review a district court’s decision on the police-power exception to bankruptcy’s automatic stay. The police-power exception provides that bankruptcy’s automatic stay does not apply to actions brought to enforce the government’s police power. The First Circuit held that orders rejecting a police-power-exception argument were final under the collateral-order doctrine.
In re Ruiz, 2024 WL 4850069 (1st Cir. Nov. 21, 2024), available at the First Circuit and Westlaw
In Hansley v. DeJoy, the Fourth Circuit dismissed an appeal despite entry of a final judgment because the district court had not resolved all claims.
Hansley v. DeJoy, 2024 WL 4947275 (4th Cir. Dec. 3, 2024), available at the Fourth Circuit and Westlaw
And i Clark v. Santander Bank, N.A., the Second Circuit held that it had jurisdiction via the collateral-order doctrine to review an order denying an estate representative’s motion to proceed pro se.
Clark v. Santander Bank, N.A., 2024 WL 4862518 (2d Cir. Nov. 22, 2024), available at CourtListener and Westlaw
A wide variety of discovery appeals. Plus the prison-mailbox/mistaken-filing rule, appealing the Yearsley doctrine, and more.
November 7, 2024
October was discovery-appeal month. The Ninth Circuit held that a § 1782 order was not final when the district court had not resolved post-order objections to the discovery. The Fifth Circuit permitted an immediate appeal from a discovery order that implicated First Amendment interests. The Eleventh Circuit held that a party could not take a Perlman appeal when the same objections to discovery could be addressed through the party’s own contempt appeal. And a new cert petition asks if discovery orders are immediately appealable when a defendant has raised the qualified-immunity defense.
There were some additional decisions of note, including an attempted collateral-order appeal on the Yearsley doctrine and the Fifth Circuit’s reconciliation of the prison-mailbox and the mistaken-filing rules. But let’s start with a nice reminder that appellate courts need to have their own jurisdiction before they can address the district court’s.
Another split on pure Bivens appeals, no equitable exceptions for Rule 4(a)(4), another failure to apply the Rule 3(c) amendments, and more.
October 5, 2024
September saw yet another court of appeals split over whether federal officials can immediately appeal the Bivens question without a qualified-immunity appeal. I’ve been following this issue for a while, and at least one more court of appeals is poised to address it. I won’t be surprised to see some cert petitions on this matter in the not-too-distant future.
In other developments, the Second Circuit held that Rule 4(a)(4) is a mandatory claims-processing rule, meaning that a court cannot excuse a failure to comply with it. The Tenth Circuit again failed to apply the Rule 3(c) amendments to a notice of appeal, instead limiting the scope of appeal to the order designated in the notice. And the Second Circuit addressed the state-sponsored terrorism bar to appeals from denials of foreign sovereign immunity. Plus the scope of remand appeals, the prison-mailbox rule applied to electronic filing, and more.
A new puppy! Plus the appeal clock for fee orders, the scope of § 1292(b) appeals, filter-protocol appeals, and more.
September 5, 2024
A new assistant paw-fessor/junior paw-ssociate joined Final Decisions.
That didn’t leave a lot of time to write this month’s roundup. So this month is mostly quick notes. But that doesn’t mean there weren’t cases of interest.
The scope and availability of arbitration appeals, remand appeals in naturalization proceedings, the Rule 3(c) amendments, and more.
August 5, 2024
July was a fairly quiet month. But there were still a few decisions worth discussing.
Another expansion of qualified-immunity appeals, manufactured finality in the agency context, more non-party privilege appeals, and more.
July 8, 2024
Quick roundup this month, starting with another expansion of the scope of qualified-immunity appeals.
Two Supreme Court decisions implicating appellate jurisdiction, another rejection of pure Bivens appeals, some rejected discretionary appeals, and much more.
June 5, 2024
Last month saw the Supreme Court wrap up its appellate-jurisdiction docket for the term. The Court held that district courts must stay actions after ordering arbitration so long as a party requests a stay. The Court also held that another deadline—the time to appeal MSPB decisions—is not jurisdictional.
The courts of appeals also issued several decisions of note. The Tenth Circuit rejected the government’s efforts to obtain pure Bivens appeals. The Federal Circuit held that a denial of PREP Act immunity was not appealable via the collateral-order doctrine. And the Third Circuit explained that Rule 23(f) appeals should involve novel and unresolved questions concerning class certification—not novel and unresolved questions on the merits. Plus much more, including multiple decisions on the meaning of claims, counts, theories, and orders when it comes to discretionary appeals.
Notices of appeal, manufactured finality, unresolved claims, qualified-immunity appeals, and much, much more.
May 3, 2024
April was a very busy month, with dozens of decisions and developments worth mentioning. Let’s get started.
Reviewing hardship determinations in immigration appeals, reconsidering motions-panel decisions, church-autonomy appeals, CAFA remands, pendent appellate jurisdiction in Rule 23(f) appeals, and much more.
April 3, 2024
March was a busy month. Let’s start with the Supreme Court’s decision holding that appellate courts had jurisdiction to review hardship determinations in immigration appeals.
Some questions about the collateral-order doctrine. Plus hindsight regarding the appeal deadline, admiralty appeals, and much more.
March 9, 2024
Decisions from last month raised some interesting questions about the role of the collateral-order doctrine, particularly when it comes to immunities and criminal appeals. In other developments, the Eleventh Circuit deemed an appeal untimely after concluding that—in hindsight—a post-judgment motion was not really a Rule 59 motion. The Ninth Circuit split on what it means to determine “rights and liabilities” for purposes of admiralty appeals. And the Fifth Circuit heard another governmental-privilege appeal. Plus appeals from reinstated removal orders, improper qualified-immunity appeals, and more.