Post-Judgment Motions & the Appeal Clock for Interlocutory Orders

In Gelin v. Baltimore County, the Fourth Circuit held that Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(4)(A) applies to appealable interlocutory orders. So a motion to reconsider such an order resets the time to appeal. The court added that a motion can effectively be one seeking reconsideration even though the motion does not cite to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) and instead relies on a different rule.

This all meant that the appeal in Gelin was not late. In fact, it was too early. The district court had not resolved all issues raised in the reconsideration motion. The Fourth Circuit accordingly held the appeal in abeyance while the district court fully disposed of the reconsideration motion.

The Reconsideration Motion in Gelin

Simplifying a bit, Gelin involved civil rights claims against a county and its employees stemming from the death of a county prisoner. The district court denied the defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings, concluding that the plaintiffs had adequately stated claims under both § 1983 and state law. The district court also rejected the defendants’ invocations of qualified immunity and immunity under state law.

The defendants then moved for reconsideration. Much of that motion challenged the district court’s decision. But the motion also pointed out that the district court had not addressed whether some of the defendants had immunity from the plaintiffs’ common-law negligence count.

The district court largely denied the motion. But the district court recognized its oversight on the immunity/common-law negligence issue. The court accordingly asked the plaintiffs to respond to that immunity defense. But before the plaintiffs could do so, the defendants appealed.

Not Too Late, but Too Early

The Fourth Circuit held that the appeal was improper. The problem was not that the defendants waited too long to appeal. Instead, their appeal was premature.

Resetting the Appeal Clock for Interlocutory Orders

The defendants appealed more than 30 days after the district court’s denial of their motion for judgment on the pleadings. But Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(4)(A) provides that certain post-judgment motions reset the appeal clock. Among those motions is one to alter or amend the judgment under Rule 59(e).

The Fourth Circuit held that Rule 4(a)(4)(A) applied despite the interlocutory character of the district court’s decision. Rule 4(a)(4)(A) applies to post-judgment motions. And Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(a) defines a “judgment” to include “any order from which an appeal lies.” So the denial of immunity was a “judgment” to which Rule 4(a)(4)(A) applied. In so holding, the Fourth Circuit split with the Eleventh Circuit, which has held that Rule 4(a)(4) “cannot apply” to qualified-immunity appeals.

(Technically speaking, appeals from the denial of qualified immunity are not interlocutory—they are “final decisions” under the collateral-order doctrine. But I find it much more useful to speak of interlocutory appeals as any appeals that come before a final judgment, regardless of whether appellate jurisdiction comes via 28 U.S.C. § 1291 or some exception to the final-judgment rule.)

Effectively a Rule 59(e) Motion

The Fourth Circuit added that the defendants’ failure to invoke Rule 59(e) did not preclude application of Rule 4(a)(4)(A).

The defendants’ motion cited to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(b), which governs amendments of a court’s findings after a bench trial. The defendants in Gelin thus relied on the wrong rule. But the Fourth Circuit refused to “apply Rule 4(a)(4) so woodenly.” The substance of the motion mattered. And the motion in Gelin sought to alter the judgment—precisely the relief that can be sought under Rule 59(e).

The Not-Yet-Fully-Disposed-of Reconsideration Motion

There was still the problem of the district court’s having not fully resolved the motion for reconsideration. Granted, the district court denied reconsideration. But the motion also sought amendments to the judgment on the unaddressed state immunity/common-law negligence issue. And the district court had not decided that issue. So the district court had not fully disposed of the post-judgment motion. That meant the appeal was early.

The Fourth Circuit decided to hold the appeal in abeyance until the district court fully resolved the defendants’ motion. Once the district court does so, the defendants’ notice of appeal will ripen into an effective notice. (Given Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(4)(B)(ii), the defendants will probably want to file a new or amended notice after that decision if they hope to challenge it on appeal.) And no remand was necessary; the notice of appeal was simply dormant, meaning that adjudicatory authority was not shared by the district and appellate courts.

Gelin v. Baltimore County, 2024 WL 4971440 (4th Cir. Dec. 4, 2024), available at the Fourth Circuit and Westlaw