The Appeal Deadline, Hindsight & Ineffective Rule 59 Motions

A motion to alter or amend a judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) normally resets the appeal deadline. But in SEC v. TCA Fund Management Group, the Eleventh Circuit held that a post-judgment motion was not really a Rule 59 motion. That means the motion did not reset the appeal deadline, and the notice of appeal was late.

This is a rough way to treat post-judgment motion. The appellants in TCA Fund Management likely relied on their motion—which was styled a Rule 59 motion—when determining the time to appeal. I don’t see a good reason for a court of appeals to say, in hindsight, that a motion was inadequate and thus did not reset the appeal deadline. The time to appeal should be—above all—clear. Appellate courts’ second guessing of post-judgment motions injects uncertainty into determining the appeal deadline. It also opens the door to appellees’ arguing that a post-judgment motion didn’t count for purposes of resetting the appeal deadline.

The Appeal in TCA Fund Management

TCA Fund Management stemmed from receivership proceedings. Simplifying more than a bit, the district court approved the receiver’s distribution plan. But the district court stayed the order for 30 days so that the parties who opposed the distribution plan could appeal and seek an appellate stay.

The thing is, the SEC was a party to the litigation. So the appeal deadline was 60 days, not 30 days. A stay to allow the appellants to seek an appellate stay accordingly needed to account for the longer appeal period.

So before the initial 30 days passed, the would-be appellants filed a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). They asked the district court to alter or amend the distribution order to account for the 60-day appeal deadline. The district court granted that motion. And a little over a month later, the would-be appellants filed their notice of appeal.

Hindsight About the Rule 59 Motion

The Eleventh Circuit dismissed the appeal as untimely.

To be sure, a Rule 59(e) motion normally resets the appeal deadline. But according to the Eleventh Circuit, the would-be appellants’ motion was not really a Rule 59(e) motion. The court would “look beyond the styling and form of the motion to its substance.” And to be a Rule 59(e) motion, the court said, “the motion must seek reconsideration of the merits of the district court’s original decision.”

The motion in TCA Fund Management did not do so. The court said that the motion involved matters separate from the merits. That is, the motion asked only to extend a stay given the longer appeal period. It did not contest the district court’s approval of the distribution plan.

The motion was thus not really one under Rule 59(e). So it did not reset the appeal deadline. And under the normal appeal deadline (calculated from the district court’s approval of the distribution plan), the notice of appeal was late.

Hindsight & the Appeal Deadline

I disagree with this decision. I see at least three problems.

First, it muddies the calculation of the appeal deadline. That deadline needs to be clear. Relying on a motion’s caption provides that clarity. Allowing courts to examine, in hindsight, whether a post-judgment motion was really what it purported to be injects uncertainty into the deadline.

Second, no good comes from shortening the appeal window by re-examining the substance of a post-judgment motion. No one can claim to be surprised—much less harmed—when the appeal deadline is calculated after the district court disposes of a motion that was presented as one under Rule 59. And this shortening of the appeal window deprives litigants of their right to appeal due to a minor procedural error (if it is an error at all).

Third, the decision invites appellees to argue that post-judgment motions were not what they purported to be. This is needless procedural litigation that serves no legitimate purpose.

Granted, looking to a motion’s substance (rather than just its styling) might make sense when doing so would extend the appeal deadline and make an appeal timely. Doing so would avoid litigants’ forfeiting their right to appeal. But so long as a motion claims to be one under Rule 59, I would treat it as such for purposes of resetting the appeal clock.

I’ll also note that much of the caselaw on which TCA Fund Management comes from a different time and a different version of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4. Under the old Rule 4, certain post-judgment motions invalidated already-filed notices of appeal. (Nowadays, those notices relate forward to the disposition of the last post-judgment motion.) So courts had good reason to avoid calling something a Rule 59 motion: doing so could avoid invalidating a notice of appeal.

The Start of the Appeal Clock

One last thought about TCA Fund Management: I don’t think the appeal clock actually started running at the district court’s distribution order. That order was immediately appealable via the collateral-order doctrine. But even with orders appealable under that doctrine, the appeal clock does not start running until that judgment is entered on the docket.

Normally that requires setting out the judgment in a separate document under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58. If the district court fails to enter this separate document, the judgment is deemed entered—and the appeal clock starts—150 days after the decision.

I don’t think the distribution plan was ever set out in a separate document. That means the appeal clock did not start running until 150 days after the decision. The notice of appeal was filed well within that time.

The relationship between interlocutory appeals and a judgment’s entry is frequently overlooked. But it’s important, as it completely changes the appeal math.

SEC v. TCA Fund Management Group, 2024 WL 448385 (11th Cir. Feb. 6, 2024), available at the Eleventh Circuit and Westlaw