The Month in Federal Appellate Jurisdiction: November 2024

November saw a pair of interesting decisions on the application of Smith v. Spizzirri as well as a formal standard for successive injunction appeals in the Tenth Circuit. But let’s start with a decision on whether a post-judgment motion to reconsider reset the appeal clock.

• The Sixth Circuit on Post-Judgment Motions that Don’t Reset the Appeal Clock
• Applying Smith v. Spizzirri
• The Tenth Circuit’s Standard on Successive Injunction Appeals
• The Fifth Circuit Heard Another Governmental-Privilege Appeal
• Cert Petition the Eleventh Circuit’s Both-Questions Rule for Qualified-Immunity Appeals
• The Month’s Improper Qualified-Immunity Appeals
• Quick Notes

The Sixth Circuit on Post-Judgment Motions that Don’t Reset the Appeal Clock

Disclosure: I consulted on the plaintiff’s motion to reconsider this decision.

In Miller v. William Beaumont Hospital, the Sixth Circuit held that a post-judgment motion for reconsideration did not reset the appeal clock because the motion did not invoke Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). The plaintiff had relied on an abrogated local rule that authorized motions for reconsideration. According to the Sixth Circuit, reliance on the local rule prevented the motion from being one under Rule 59(e). So the motion for reconsideration did not reset the appeal time, making the plaintiff’s appeal from the merits decision untimely.

After the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant in Miller, the plaintiff filed a motion titled “Motion for Reconsideration.” The body of the motion relied on an old version of Eastern District of Michigan Local Rule 7.1(h). Until 2021, that rule authorized motions for reconsideration of a judgment or order. But after recent amendments, the local rule now says that “[p]arties seeking reconsideration of final orders or judgments must file a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) or 60(b). The court will not grant reconsideration of such an order or judgment under this rule.” The district court denied the motion for failing to cite to Rules 59(e) or 60(b). The plaintiff then appealed.

If the appeal clock began running at the summary-judgment decision, the plaintiff’s appeal was late. But Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1) resets the appeal clock if a party files a timely motion under (among other provisions) Rule 59(e). The question, then, was whether the plaintiff’s motion qualified as one under Rule 59(e).

The Sixth Circuit held that it didn’t. Although prior Sixth Circuit decisions had treated motions under the old Local Rule 7.1(h) as a Rule 59(e) motion, the court would no longer do so. That’s because the current Local Rule 7.1(h) no longer authorizes relief similar to that available under Rule 59(e). According to the court, the current local rule prevents the Sixth Circuit from construing the motion as one under Rule 59(e).

There are several problems with this decision, which the plaintiff has pointed out in a motion to reconsider. Briefly, cases from the Sixth Circuit and elsewhere hold that the substance of post-judgment motions—not their styling—is what matters. Courts of appeals have accordingly treated motions as if they were brought under Rule 59(e) even though the motion did not cite that rule. Indeed, courts have held that motions reset the appeal deadline despite citing to the wrong rule.

More to the point, the plaintiff’s motion in Miller was effectively a Rule 59(e) motion. Granted, it cited to the wrong rule. But it sought the relief that Rule 59(e) authorizes. And the standard it invoked (that under the abrogated local rule) was little different than the standard courts apply to Rule 59(e) motions.

Finally, there is a general rule of federal practice that motions to reconsider filed within the time to appeal reset the appeal clock. Nothing more was needed in Miller to make the appeal timely.

The error in Miller was minor, and no one was harmed by it. The Sixth Circuit should have treated the motion as one that reset the appeal deadline. Hopefully the court rethinks this decision.

Miller v. William Beaumont Hospital, 2024 WL 4719240 (6th Cir. Nov. 8, 2024), available at the Sixth Circuit and Westlaw

Applying Smith v. Spizzirri

Last term, the Supreme Court held in Smith v. Spizzirri that district courts ordering arbitration must stay—not dismiss—the action so long as a party requests a stay. The decision had consequences for appellate jurisdiction. A decision ordering arbitration and dismissing an action is immediately appealable. A decision ordering arbitration and staying an action is not.

Last month saw two courts of appeals address the implications of Spizzirri for appellate jurisdiction. And the decisions supported my suspicion that asking for a stay is still required to get one.

Declining to Review an Arbitration Grant + Dismissal

In Bazzi v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., the Ninth Circuit declined to review a district court order that granted arbitration and then dismissed an action.

The dismissal gave the Ninth Circuit appellate jurisdiction. So the court could hear the appeal. But the court declined to do so. Given Spizzirri, the district court erred in dismissing the action. And an immediate appeal would interfere with the Federal Arbitration Act’s purpose of moving disputes to arbitration as swiftly as possible.

So rather than review the merits, the Ninth Circuit vacated the decision and remanded the action for entry of a stay.

Reviewing a Dismissal When Nobody Asked for a Stay

Contrast Bazzi with National Casualty Co. v. Continental Insurance Co., in which the Seventh Circuit refused to vacate a dismissal.

Like the district court in Bazzi, the district court in National Casualty granted the defendant’s motion to compel arbitration and—at that defendant’s request—dismissed the action. On appeal, the defendant asked the Seventh Circuit to vacate the dismissal and direct the district court to instead issue a stay.

The Seventh Circuit saw some problems with this request. The defendant had sought the dismissal, and the defendant had not filed a cross appeal. But more fundamentally, the defendant had never asked for a stay. And Spizzirri seemed to say that a request was necessary for a stay to be required. So the district court did not err in dismissing the action.

Bazzi v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 2024 WL 4690125 (9th Cir. Nov. 6, 2024), available at the Ninth Circuit and Westlaw

National Casualty Co. v. Continental Insurance Co., 2024 WL 4866798 (7th Cir. Nov. 22, 2024), available at the Seventh Circuit and Westlaw

The Tenth Circuit’s Standard on Successive Injunction Appeals

In SEC v. Young, the Tenth Circuit held that it would hear a successive preliminary-injunction appeal only when there was a change in circumstances, evidence, or law since the prior motion.

The court explained that 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) carves out a narrow exception to the final-judgment rule. The statute accordingly must be construed narrowly. So “[w]hen a district court has denied a successive motion to modify a preliminary injunction—a motion that raises the same issues or raises issues that could have been raised in a prior motion—[the court will] exercise interlocutory jurisdiction only if there was a change in circumstances, evidence, or law since the prior motion.”

The successive motion in Young did not satisfy this standard. It raised arguments that the appellants could have made—and thus forfeited—in an earlier motion. And there was no change in circumstances, evidence, or law that would warrant a second look.

SEC v. Young, 121 F.4th 70 (10th Cir. Nov. 4, 2024), available at the Tenth Circuit and Westlaw

The Fifth Circuit Heard Another Governmental-Privilege Appeal

In Jones v. Reeves, the Fifth Circuit heard an appeal from a discovery order that rejected a claim of governmental privilege. But rather than decide the privilege issue, the court concluded that the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue.

I’ve already said quite a bit about the Fifth Circuit’s allowance of governmental-privilege appeals. No need to repeat it all here.

Jones v. Reeves, 121 F.4th 531 (5th Cir. Nov. 19, 2024), available at the Fifth Circuit and Westlaw

Cert Petition the Eleventh Circuit’s Both-Questions Rule for Qualified-Immunity Appeals

A new cert petition asks the Supreme Court to reject the Eleventh Circuit’s “both-questions” rule for qualified-immunity appeals. That rule (on which I’ve written here and recently filed an amicus brief criticizing) permits the Eleventh Circuit to review the genuineness of fact disputes in qualified-immunity appeals so long as the defendant also challenges the clarity of the alleged constitutional violation.

The case is Chisesi v. Hunady (and it appears to be a cross-petition for cert). The response is due December 13, 2024.

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Chisesi v. Hunady No. 24-538 (Nov. 8, 2024), available at the Supreme Court and Westlaw

The Month’s Improper Qualified-Immunity Appeals

Here are last month’s improper, fact-based qualified-immunity appeals:

• Griffin v. Fonda, 2024 WL 4763934 (2d Cir. Nov. 13, 2024), available at CourtListener and Westlaw
• Clerkley v. Holcomb, 2024 WL 4887389 (10th Cir. Nov. 26, 2024), available at the Tenth Circuit and Westlaw

Quick Notes

In In re Ruiz, the First Circuit held that it could immediately review a district court’s decision on the police-power exception to bankruptcy’s automatic stay. The police-power exception provides that bankruptcy’s automatic stay does not apply to actions brought to enforce the government’s police power. The First Circuit held that orders rejecting a police-power-exception argument were final under the collateral-order doctrine.

In re Ruiz, 2024 WL 4850069 (1st Cir. Nov. 21, 2024), available at the First Circuit and Westlaw

In Hansley v. DeJoy, the Fourth Circuit dismissed an appeal despite entry of a final judgment because the district court had not resolved all claims.

Hansley v. DeJoy, 2024 WL 4947275 (4th Cir. Dec. 3, 2024), available at the Fourth Circuit and Westlaw

And i Clark v. Santander Bank, N.A., the Second Circuit held that it had jurisdiction via the collateral-order doctrine to review an order denying an estate representative’s motion to proceed pro se.

Clark v. Santander Bank, N.A., 2024 WL 4862518 (2d Cir. Nov. 22, 2024), available at CourtListener and Westlaw