The Week in Federal Appellate Jurisdiction: January 12–18, 2020

Last week produced a handful of interesting appellate-jurisdiction decisions. The Supreme Court held that denials of relief from bankruptcy’s automatic stay are immediately appealable. A split Ninth Circuit used mandamus to reverse a discovery order that would have have helped class-action counsel find a lead plaintiff. The Ninth Circuit also affirmed the denial of Rule 60(b)(6) relief to plaintiffs who had voluntarily dismissed their claims to secure an appeal. Plus intervention appeals, a new cert petition on the scope of qualified-immunity appeals, and a cert denial in a case that raised the reviewability of Rule 23(f) denials.

• The Supreme Court held that litigants may immediately appeal unreserved denials of relief from bankruptcy’s automatic stay
• A split Ninth Circuit used mandamus to reverse a discovery order
• The Ninth Circuit held that not all pre-Baker dismissals can be undone
• The Eleventh Circuit applied its “anomalous rule” for intervention appeals
• New cert petition on the scope of qualified-immunity appeals
• Cert denied in Apache Corp. v. Rhea

The Supreme Court held that litigants may immediately appeal unreserved denials of relief from bankruptcy’s automatic stay

In Ritzen Group, Inc. v. Jackson Masonry, LLC, the Supreme Court held that litigants may immediately appeal the conclusive denial of relief from bankruptcy’s automatic stay. Under 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), district courts have jurisdiction to hear appeals from “final judgments, orders, and decrees . . . of bankruptcy judges entered in cases and proceedings.” The Supreme Court reasoned that the adjudication of a motion to lift an automatic stay is a “proceeding.” And the conclusive denial of that motion wraps up that proceeding. The denial is accordingly final, and parties must appeal within 14 days of the decision for the appeal to be timely.

You can read all about Ritzen Group—including the Court’s interesting discussion about the risk of piecemeal review—in my post on the decision: Ritzen Group Holds that Denials of Relief from Bankruptcy’s Automatic Stay are Appealable

Ritzen Group, Inc. v. Jackson Masonry, LLC, 2020 WL 201023 (Jan. 14, 2020), available at the Supreme Court and Westlaw.

A split Ninth Circuit used mandamus to reverse a discovery order

In In re Williams-Sonoma, Inc., a district court had ordered a defendant to produce a list of its customers so opposing counsel could identify a lead plaintiff to pursue a class action. A split panel of the Ninth Circuit concluded that this discovery order was clearly erroneous and warranted reversal via mandamus.

For more, see my post on the case from last week: Split Ninth Circuit Uses Mandamus to Reverse Class Discovery.

In re Williams-Sonoma, Inc., 2020 WL 131360 (9th Cir. Jan 13, 2020), available at the Ninth Circuit and Westlaw.

The Ninth Circuit held that not all pre-Baker dismissals can be undone

In Strafford v. Eli Lilly & Co., the Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of Rule 60(b)(6) relief for a group of plaintiffs who had relied pre-Microsoft Corp. v. Baker in voluntarily dismissing their claims to secure an immediate appeal. Late last year, the Ninth Circuit held in Henson v. Fidelity National Financial, Inc. that Rule 60(b)(6) relief was appropriate for plaintiffs who had relied on that same caselaw. But Strafford held that the plaintiffs’ circumstances there were different from those in Henson and did not warrant relief.

Read more at this morning’s post: Ninth Circuit: Not All Pre-Baker Dismissals Can Be Undone.

Strafford v. Eli Lilly & Co., 2020 WL 242700 (9th Cir. 2020), available at the Ninth Circuit and Westlaw.

The Eleventh Circuit applied its “anomalous rule” for intervention appeals

In United States v. 60 Automotive Grilles, the Eleventh Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to immediately review a decision denying intervention as of right. Chrysler had sought to intervene in a civil forfeiture action involving replacement automotive grilles bearing Chrysler marks. The district court denied intervention as of right. And the Eleventh Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the district court correctly denied intervention. Practically speaking, the court of appeals reviewed and affirmed the district court’s decision. But under the “anomalous rule” that the Eleventh Circuit applies to intervention appeals, appellate jurisdiction turned on whether the district court correctly denied intervention.

For more on the decision in 60 Automotive Grilles and jurisdiction in intervention appeals generally, see my post on the case from last week: The “Anomalous Rule” for Intervention Appeals.

United States v. 60 Automotive Grilles, 2020 WL 233450 (11th Cir. Jan. 15, 2020), available at the Eleventh Circuit and Westlaw.

New cert petition on the scope of qualified-immunity appeals

A new cert petition asks the Supreme Court to summarily reverse an Eleventh Circuit decision that exceeded the court’s jurisdiction in an interlocutory qualified-immunity appeal. The case is Hinson v. Bias.

The petition argues that the Eleventh Circuit reversed the denial of qualified immunity only after assessing for itself what facts the plaintiff could prove at trial. The district court had determined that a reasonable jury could find that the plaintiff was not resisting arrest when officers struck him. But the Eleventh Circuit conducted its own “frame-by-frame” review of the video evidence and concluded that the video did not create a genuine factual dispute over whether the plaintiff was resisting. The Eleventh Circuit then relied on the defendants’ affidavits—which said that the plaintiff was resisting—and awarded them qualified immunity.

The Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson v. Jones holds that this kind of de novo review of the record evidence is improper. Although defendants have a right to immediately appeal the denial of qualified immunity, the scope of that appeal is limited when the denial comes at summary judgment. Appellate courts generally can address only whether the facts assumed by the district court amount to a clear constitutional violation; they lack jurisdiction to review the district court’s conclusion that genuine fact issues exist.

Defendants filing qualified-immunity appeals nevertheless challenge district court’s factual assumptions with some frequency. Sometimes they invoke an exception to Johnson, such as the “blatant-contradiction” exception. Other times they just challenge the facts, disregarding Johnson. And courts occasionally indulge these challenges. A summary reversal in Hinson would be a nice reminder that doing so is improper.

The response is due February 13, 2020.

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Hinson v. Bias, No. 19-872 (Jan. 10, 2020), available at the Supreme Court and Westlaw.

Cert denied in Apache Corp. v. Rhea

Finally, the Supreme Court denied cert in Apache Corp. v. Rhea. The case primarily asked if class-action certification requires a showing of “ascertainability”—a feasible way of determining who is part of the class. But the Tenth Circuit had declined to review this issue via an interlocutory Rule 23(f) appeal. So the case also asked if the Supreme Court can review a class-certification decision after the court of appeals denied a Rule 23(f) petition.