Rejecting municipal piggybacking, the jurisdictionality of cross-appeals, retroactive application of the Rule 3(c) amendments, proper Rule 54(b) partial judgments, and more.
July 19, 2022
Lots of decisions this week. Let’s start with a pair of cases that rejected municipalities’ attempts to tag along with their employees’ qualified-immunity appeals.
- The Fifth Circuit Rejected Two Municipalities’ Attempts to Tagalong in Qualified-Immunity Appeals
- The Sixth Circuit Held That the Requirement for a Cross-Appeal Is Not Jurisdictional
- The First Circuit Applied the Rule 3(c) Amendments Retroactively
- The Seventh Circuit Dismissed an Improper Rule 54(b) Appeal Due to Impermissible Overlap With the Remaining Claims
- The Fourth Circuit Allowed a Rule 54(b) Appeal From a Duty-To-Defend Decisions
- The Sixth Circuit Reviewed a TRO Denial, Which Effectively Denied a Preliminary Injunction
- The Ninth Circuit on the Ambiguous Without-Prejudice Dismissal of a Complaint
The Fifth Circuit Rejected Two Municipalities’ Attempts to Tagalong in Qualified-Immunity Appeals
In both Harris v. Clay County and Williams v. City of Yazoo, the Fifth Circuit dismissed a municipality’s attempt to piggyback an appeal from the denial of summary judgment on municipal-liability claims.
Both cases involved civil-rights claims against a municipality (a county in Harris, a city in Yazoo) and its employees. And in both cases, the district court denied the individual defendants’ requests for qualified immunity and denied the municipality’s motion for summer judgment. The individual employees then appealed from the denial of immunity, as they have a right to do under Mitchell v. Forsyth. The municipalities then tried to piggyback on those appeals.
Municipal defendants do not have a right to appeal from an adverse summary-judgment decision on municipal liability. But most courts of appeals allow municipalities to tag along when the appellate court determines that the individual defendants did not violate the constitution. Upon determining that the individual defendants did not violate the constitution, there is no constitutional violation for the city to be liable for. Most courts say that this makes the two issues—qualified immunity and municipal liability—“inextricably intertwined.” And that intertwinement permits the court of appeals to extend pendent appellate jurisdiction over the municipality’s appeal.
But not the Fifth Circuit. In both Harris and Williams, the Fifth Circuit explained that it has rejected municipal piggybacking. (And in the course of doing so, both decisions cited to my article on the topic!) The Fifth Circuit accordingly dismissed the municipalities’ appeals for a lack of appellate jurisdiction.
Harris v. Clay County, 2022 WL 2662099 (5th Cir. July 11, 2022), available at the Fifth Circuit and Westlaw.
Williams v. City of Yazoo, 2022 WL 2762707 (5th Cir. July 15, 2022), available at the Fifth Circuit and Westlaw.
The Sixth Circuit Held That the Requirement for a Cross-Appeal Is Not Jurisdictional
In Georgia-Pacific Consumer Products LP v. NCR Corp., the Sixth Circuit held that the requirement for a cross-appeal is not jurisdictional. So an appellant can forfeit the objection that no proper cross-appeal was filed.
Georgia-Pacific arose from a CERCLA-contribution dispute and is (as one might expect of a CERCLA-contribution dispute) complex. Simplifying a fair bit, the owner of polluted land sued several defendants, seeking cleanup costs. The district court rejected the defendants’ statute-of-limitations defense and eventually apportioned liability among the plaintiff and the defendants. Only one of those defendants—a firm called International Paper—appealed, challenging the district court’s rejection of the limitations defense. Another defendant—a firm called Weyerhouser—also initially appealed, but it later voluntarily dismissed its own appeal. That left Weyerhouser as a nominal appellee. And in its brief, Weyerhouser asked the Sixth Circuit to also dismiss the claims against it on limitations grounds.
A panel of the Sixth Circuit determined that the district court erred in rejecting the limitations defense and reversed the judgment against both defendants. The plaintiff then sought rehearing, arguing that Weyerhouser’s failure to file a cross-appeals precluded the Sixth Circuit from altering the judgment against it.
In denying rehearing, the Sixth Circuit determined that the plaintiff had forfeited any objection to the lack of a cross-appeal. To be sure, the lack of a cross-appeal would normally prevent an appellate court from altering the judgment against a non-appealing party. But the plaintiff had never complained about the lack of a formal cross-appeal in its briefing or at oral argument. The plaintiff raised the issue only after losing on appeal. The Sixth Circuit also explained that forfeiture was available because the filing requirement was not jurisdictional. It comes only from the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, not a statute. And rules of procedure don’t create jurisdictional requirements.
Georgia-Pacific Consumer Products LP v. NCR Corp., 2022 WL 2751686 (6th Cir. July 14, 2022), available at the Sixth Circuit and Westlaw.
The First Circuit Applied the Rule 3(c) Amendments Retroactively
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3 was amended last December to end the silly practice of appellate courts’ using the notice-of-appeal designation requirement to limit the scope of appeals. A few months ago, the Eighth Circuit appeared to treat these amendments as non-retroactive, applying its old caselaw on this issue to a notice filed before the amendments took effect.
But last week, in Gonpo v. Sonam’s Stonewalls & Art, LLC, the First Circuit said that the amendments were retroactive. The appellant in Gonpo specified both the final judgment and certain interlocutory orders in his notice of appeal. But in the appeal, he challenged other interlocutory orders that had not been designated. Some cases from before the recent amendments to Rule 3 would have limited the scope of appeal to the designated decisions. But Rule 3 now requires that appellants expressly limit the scope of their appeals. The appellant in Gonpo had not done so. The First Circuit accordingly had jurisdiction to address all orders that merged into the final judgment.
Gonpo v. Sonam’s Stonewalls & Art, LLC, 2022 WL 2763131 (1st Cir. July 15, 2022), available at the First Circuit and Westlaw.
The Seventh Circuit Dismissed an Improper Rule 54(b) Appeal Due to Impermissible Overlap With the Remaining Claims
In Rankins v. System Solutions of Kentucky, LLC, the Seventh Circuit dismissed a Rule 54(b) appeal because the resolved claim overlapped too much with the remaining claims.
Rankins involved a products liability claim in which the plaintiff had been injured by a winch system. After the plaintiff’s employer lost the winch, the defendant brought a third-party spoliation claim against the employer. The plaintiff eventually settled with the employer. The district court then dismissed the third-party claims against the employer, concluding that the settlement discharged all liabilities related to the plaintiff’s injury. The district court also entered a partial judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), saying that there was no just cause for delaying an appeal of the dismissal of the third-party spoliation claims.
The Seventh Circuit determined that the Rule 54(b) partial judgment was improper. Rule 54(b) requires (among other things) that the resolved and unresolved claims not overlap. That way the appeal does not disrupt the district court proceedings, nor does the court of appeals revisit the same or similar issues in multiple appeals. As the Seventh Circuit explained, Rule 54(b) applies only to “situations where concentrating all claims in a single appeal so as to preserve judicial resources is unnecessary because the certified claim is akin to a standalone lawsuit.”
There was too much overlap in Rankins. Impermissible overlap exists when “the resolution of the claims pending in the district court could ‘undercut’ or otherwise alter the ‘final’ claim.” And the resolution of the plaintiff’s claims could undercut the appeal. That is, it was not clear that the defendant would be harmed by the loss of the winch—the defendant might win. And a win for the defendant would make the third-party claims irrelevant. “Given this entanglement and the needless duplication that would result if [the court of appeals] were to pass judgment on the spoliation issue at this juncture, the district court’s dismissal of [the] spoliation claim was not sufficiently distinct from the remainder of the case.”
Rankins v. System Solutions of Kentucky, LLC, 2022 WL 2662141 (July 11, 2022), available at the Seventh Circuit and Westlaw.
The Fourth Circuit Allowed a Rule 54(b) Appeal From a Duty-To-Defend Decisions
Contrast Rankins with Church Mutual Insurance Co. v. Lake point Assisted Living, Inc., in which the Fourth Circuit reviewed a district court decision on an insurer’s duty to defend via Rule 54(b).
The case involved an insurance-coverage dispute, with the insurance company seeking a declaration that it neither had to defend nor indemnify the insured. The insured responded with counterclaims. The district court eventually determined that the insurer had a duty to defend. But the district court did not resolve the counterclaims. To facilitate an immediate appeal on the duty-to-defend claim, the district court entered a partial judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b).
The Fourth Circuit concluded that the partial judgment was proper. Under Rule 54(b), the district court can enter a partial, appealable judgment on the resolution of some (but not all) claims in a multi-claim action when (1) the district court finally adjudicates those claims and (2) there is reason for delaying the appeal. In Church Mutual, the district court had fully resolved the duty-to-defend issue. And immediate appellate review would “inform the district court’s opinion on the remaining counterclaims”—a reversal might moot those counterclaims.
Church Mutual Insurance Co. v. Lake point Assisted Living, Inc., 2022 WL 2702427 (4th Cir. July 12, 2022), ;available at the Fourth Circuit and Westlaw.
The Sixth Circuit Reviewed a TRO Denial, Which Effectively Denied a Preliminary Injunction
In A&W X-Press, Inc. v. FCA US, LLC, the Sixth Circuit reviewed what was nominally the denial of a temporary restraining order.
TROs normally aren’t immediately appealable via 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). But the district court’s decision in A&W X-Press effectively denied a preliminary injunction. The plaintiff had sought a preliminary injunction along with the TRO. While the district court had addressed only the latter, the district court also denied all relief. The district court then did nothing else with the preliminary-injunction request in the intervening seven months. The Sixth Circuit explained that “[i]f the district court’s order was meant to address solely the TRO request, surely another order on the preliminary injunction would have followed.” The district court had thus effectively denied a preliminary injunction, which the Sixth Circuit could review.
A&W X-Press, Inc. v. FCA US, LLC, 2022 WL 2759872 (6th Cir. July 14, 2022), available at the Sixth Circuit and Westlaw.
The Ninth Circuit on the Ambiguous Without-Prejudice Dismissal of a Complaint
In Unified Data Services, LLC v. FTC, the Ninth Circuit determined that the without-prejudice dismissal of a complaint was meant to end a case, thereby resulting in a final decision. The district court “dismissed the complaint without prejudice and acknowledged that amendment may not be futile.” That created a potential finality issue, as a dismissal with leave to amend is normally not a final decision. But the district court did not grant leave to amend. And the clerk entered judgment on the same day as the dismissal. The combination of these two events (or non-event and event) convinced the Ninth Circuit that the district court was finished with the case.
Unified Data Services, LLC v. FTC, 2022 WL 2711413 (9th Cir. July 13, 2022), available at the Ninth Circuit and Westlaw.