Appealing a Juvenile Delinquency Act-based challenge to an indictment, relating forward notices of appeal after dismissals with leave to amend, finality and standing in bankruptcy appeals, and more.
March 29, 2022
Last week, the Ninth Circuit heard an immediate appeal from an unsuccessful challenge to an indictment. The defendant contended that the Juvenile Delinquency Act barred his prosecution as an adult. The Ninth Circuit held that the defendant could immediately appeal this decision via the collateral-order doctrine.
In another decision, the Ninth Circuit addressed the relation forward of a notice of appeal. The district court had dismissed a complaint with leave to amend, and the plaintiffs appealed rather than amend. The Ninth Circuit said that at the time of this appeal, it lacked jurisdiction and the notice was premature. But the district court’s subsequent entry of a final order of dismissal saved the premature notice.
In other decisions, the Second Circuit dismissed an appeal from a district court decision partially affirming and partially vacating a bankruptcy court’s contempt order. Two courts of appeals addressed improper factual challenges in qualified-immunity appeals. The D.C. Circuit dismissed an appeal from an order referring an attorney for potential discipline. And the Tenth Circuit dismissed an appeal because the plaintiff had voluntarily dismissed its claims against a defendant without prejudice.
- The Ninth Circuit on the Juvenile Delinquency Act & the Collateral-Order Doctrine
- The Ninth Circuit on Relating Forward a Notice of Appeal
- The Second Circuit on Bankruptcy, Contempt, and Appellate Standing
- The Week’s Fact-Based Qualified-Immunity Appeals
- Quick Notes
The Ninth Circuit on the Juvenile Delinquency Act & the Collateral-Order Doctrine
In United States v. Mendez, the Ninth Circuit reviewed the refusal to dismiss an indictment as barred by the Juvenile Delinquency Act.
Simplifying a bit, the defendant in Mendez was originally charged as a juvenile for his involvement in a street gang while under the age of 18. The government then later obtained a superseding indictment that charged the defendant with a racketeering conspiracy. The acts underlying this conspiracy occurred both before and after the defendant turned 18, and the government proceeded to prosecute the defendant as an adult.
When the government voluntarily dismissed the juvenile information, the defendant moved to dismiss the superseding indictment. The defendant argued that the Juvenile Delinquency Act required the government to either obtain permission to try the defendant as an adult (which the government had not done) or proceed only with the original juvenile prosecution rather. The district court denied this request, and the defendant appealed.
The Ninth Circuit held that it had jurisdiction over the appeal under the collateral-order doctrine. That doctrine deems certain district court orders final when those orderes (1) conclusively resolve an issue, (2) involve an important issue that is separate from the merits, and (3) would be effectively unreviewable in an appeal from a final judgment. The district court’s order in Mendez satisfied each requirement. The district court had conclusively decided that the Juvenile Delinquency Act did not bar the prosecution. The question of whether the Act barred prosecution was separate from the merits of the underlying case. And the defendant claimed a statutory right to avoid trial that could be vindicated only by an immediate appeal.
The Ninth Circuit went on to hold that “[w]hen a minor ratifies his pre-majority conduct by continuing to participate in an ongoing criminal conspiracy after his eighteenth birthday, the offense is not insulated by the [Act]’s procedural enclave.”
United States v. Mendez, 2022 WL 872248 (9th Cir. Mar. 24, 2022), available at the Ninth Circuit and Westlaw.
The Ninth Circuit on Relating Forward a Notice of Appeal
In Weston Family Partnership LLLP v. Twitter, Inc., the Ninth Circuit held that the subsequent entry of a final order of dismissal saved a premature notice of appeal.
Weston Family involved securities claims against Twitter. The district court eventually dismissed those claims with leave to amend. But rather than amend, the plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal. Several days later, the district court issued a final order of dismissal and closed the case.
The Ninth Circuit held that it had jurisdiction over the appeal. According to the court of appeals, the district court’s dismissal with leave to amend was not final. The notice of appeal was thus premature. But the district court entered a final order of dismissal before the Ninth Circuit heard the appeal. Under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(2), the premature notice related forward to the final decision and was therefore effective.
Weston Family Partnership LLLP v. Twitter, Inc., 2022 WL 853252 (9th Cir. Mar. 23, 2022), available at the Ninth Circuit and Westlaw.
The Second Circuit on Bankruptcy, Contempt, and Appellate Standing
In In re DiPietro, the Second Circuit dismissed an appeal from a district court decision partially affirming a bankruptcy court’s contempt order.
Simplifying a bit, DiPietro arose from a consumer bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court determined that the debtor’s credit union had violated bankruptcy’s automatic stay by limiting the debtor’s access to his account. The bankruptcy court accordingly held the credit union in contempt, awarded damages to the debtor, and imposed additional sanctions. The credit union appealed that order to the district court, which affirmed the contempt finding. But the district court also vacated the damages and sanctions awards and remanded them for further consideration. The credit union then sought and obtained a partial judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) and sought further review in the Second Circuit.
The Second Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction. The district court’s order affirmed the bankruptcy court only in part. That order also remanded for significant further proceedings on damages and other sanctions. The contempt proceeding was thus not complete, and there was no final decision.
The district court’s partial judgment did not fix the finality problem. Rule 54(b) allows a district court to enter a partial judgment on the resolution of some (but not all) claims in a multi-claim or multi-party action. It does not apply to the partial resolution of a single claim. And the district court’s order left the contempt proceeding only partially resolved.
The Second Circuit added that the credit union lacked standing to appeal because it was a prevailing party. The details on this are sparse. Apparently the credit union had prevailed in the underlying claims against it. The affirmed contempt order was thus an interlocutory order with no practical consequences (the district court had vacated the damages and sanctions). With no adverse judgment against it, the credit union could not appeal.
In re DiPietro, 2022 WL 880485 (2d Cir. Mar. 25, 2022), available at CourtListener and Westlaw.
The Week’s Fact-Based Qualified-Immunity Appeals
Defendants have a right to immediately appeal from the denial of qualified immunity. But the scope of those appeals is limited when the district court denies immunity at summary judgment. With rare exceptions, defendants appealing from the denial of qualified immunity at summary judgment can dispute only the materiality of any fact disputes. They cannot argue that the district court erred in concluding that fact disputes were genuine. That is, they cannot dispute the district court’s determination of what a reasonable jury could find.
Defendants regularly flout this limit on the scope of interlocutory qualified-immunity appeals. They appeal from the denial of immunity to argue that the district court erred in determining what a reasonable jury could find. Appellate courts normally dismiss these improper appeals. But at that point, the damage is done. District courts often stay proceedings pending the appeal, which can take months or years to resolve. These improper appeals thus add wholly unnecessary difficulty, expense, and delay to civil-rights litigation. These improper appeals are also one of the main reasons why, should qualified immunity stick around in its current or an altered form, the rules governing qualified-immunity appeals need to change.
Last week saw two examples of these improper qualified-immunity appeals.
E.W. v. Detroit Public School District
Simplifying a bit, E.W. v. Detroit Public School District involved a public-school student’s excessive-force claims against a school security officer. The district court denied the defendant’s request for qualified immunity. According to the district court, a reasonable jury could find that student was not resisting, nor did he pose any threat, when the security officer swung his arm at the plaintiff and broke his jaw. The officer nevertheless appealed to argue that he did not swing his arm at the student. The Sixth Circuit noted that it could not address the genuineness of this fact dispute in a qualified-immunity appeal.
E.W. v. Detroit Public School District, 2022 WL 837496 (6th Cir. Mar. 21, 2022), available at the Sixth Circuit and Westlaw.
Estate of Aguirre v. County of Riverside
Estate of Aguirre v. County of Riverside involved a fatal police shooting. According to the district court, genuine fact disputes existed as to several key facts that bore on whether the decedent posed a threat to anyone. For example, the parties disputed how close the decedent was to bystanders, whether the decedent was retreating, and whether the decedent held a stick in a threatening manner. The district court accordingly denied qualified immunity. The officer appealed. And in that appeal, the officer gave a “defense-friendly version of the facts.” The Ninth Circuit noted that these challenges to the genuineness of fact disputes were improper. But the court ignored those factual challenges—“distinguishing between advocacy and record itself”—and addressed whether the district court’s version of events amounted to a violation of clearly established law. Doing so, the court of appeals affirmed.
Estate of Aguirre v. County of Riverside, 2022 WL 871286 (9th Cir. Mar. 24, 2022), available at the Ninth Circuit and Westlaw.
Quick Notes
In Wisconsin Voters Alliance v. Harris, the D.C. Circuit dismissed an appeal from an order referring an attorney for potential discipline. The court of appeals analogized the order to “a run-of-the-mill agency order initiating an administrative investigation.” The order did not determine that discipline was warranted or impose any sanction. Because the order did not determine any rights or liabilities, it was not an appealable final decision.
Wisconsin Voters Alliance v. Harris, 2022 WL 838979 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 22, 2022), available at the D.C. Circuit and Westlaw.
And in Kristina Consulting Group v. Debt Pay Gateway, Inc., the Tenth Circuit dismissed an appeal because the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed its claims against one defendant without prejudice. Simplifying a fair bit, the plaintiffs in Kristina Consulting brought claims against several defendants. The district court dismissed one of the defendants for a lack of personal jurisdiction. The plaintiffs then voluntarily dismissed their claims against the other defendants and tried to appeal the district court’s personal-jurisdiction decision.
The Tenth Circuit held that the plaintiffs had improperly tried to manufacture the appeal. The statute of limitations on the voluntarily dismissed claims had not yet run. So the plaintiffs could reassert the voluntarily dismissed claims. The action was not yet over. So there was no final, appealable decision.
Kristina Consulting Group v. Debt Pay Gateway, Inc., 2022 WL 881575 (10th Cir. Mar. 25, 2022), available at the Tenth Circuit and Westlaw.