Monthly Roundup

The Month in Federal Appellate Jurisdiction: March 2024

Reviewing hardship determinations in immigration appeals, reconsidering motions-panel decisions, church-autonomy appeals, CAFA remands, pendent appellate jurisdiction in Rule 23(f) appeals, and much more.

April 3, 2024

By Bryan Lammon

March was a busy month. Let’s start with the Supreme Court’s decision holding that appellate courts had jurisdiction to review hardship determinations in immigration appeals.

Wilkinson & Appellate Review of Hardship Determinations
Reconsidering Motions-Panel Decisions on Appeal Dismissals
The Seventh Circuit Split on Church-Autonomy Appeals
Appealing CAFA Remands via § 1291
Reviewing Motions to Dismiss via Rule 23(f)
The Appeal Deadline & Subsequent Rule 59(e) Motions
Appealing Future Orders
A Lack of Finality Despite a Final Judgment
The Merger Doctrine After Sanction Dismissals
Appealing § 3605 Transfers
A Dated Discussion of Rule 3(c)
The Fifth Circuit on Appealing Procedurally Improper Motions
The Month’s Improper, Fact-Based Qualified-Immunity Appeals
Quick Note

Wilkinson & Appellate Review of Hardship Determinations

In Wilkinson v. Garland, the Supreme Court held that courts of appeals could review whether an immigration petitioner had shown the hardship necessary to be eligible for cancellation of removal. The majority thought that this holding was a straightforward extension of 2020’s Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr. But several justices doubted that Congress intended for such a board scope of review in immigration appeals.

Wilkinson v. Garland, 2024 WL 1160995 (Mar. 19, 2024), available at the Supreme Court and Westlaw

Reconsidering Motions-Panel Decisions on Appeal Dismissals

In Nordgren v. Hennepin County, a divided Eight Circuit held that a merits panel could reexamine a motions-panel decision on appellate jurisdiction. The majority went on to hold that a post-judgment motion—though titled a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e)—was not really a Rule 59(e) motion and thus did not reset the appeal clock.

Nordgren v. Hennepin County, 2024 WL 1205817 (8th Cir. Mar. 21, 2024), available at the Eighth Circuit and Westlaw

The Seventh Circuit Split on Church-Autonomy Appeals

In Garrick v. Moody Bible Institute, a divided Seventh Circuit held that a defendant cannot immediately appeal from the denial of a motion to dismiss on church-autonomy grounds. The Seventh Circuit thereby joined the Second and Tenth Circuits in both its ultimate holding and its having a split court.

Garrick v. Moody Bible Institute, 2024 WL 1154135 (7th Cir. Mar. 18, 2024), available at the Seventh Circuit and Westlaw

Appealing CAFA Remands via § 1291

In Cheapside Minerals, Ltd. v. Devon Energy Production Co., the Fifth Circuit held that a remand under the Class Action Fairness Act’s local-controversy rule was an appealable final decision under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. That meant the appellant did not need to resort to a discretionary appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c).

Cheapside Minerals, Ltd. v. Devon Energy Production Co., 2024 WL 886951 (5th Cir. Mar. 1, 2024), available at the Fifth Circuit and Westlaw

Reviewing Motions to Dismiss via Rule 23(f)

In Elegant Massage, LLC v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., a divided Fourth Circuit reviewed—and reversed—the denial of a motion dismiss while hearing a class-certification appeal under Rule 23(f). The majority thought it could do so because the class-certification and motion-to-dismiss decisions were “so interconnected as to require concurrent review.” Judge Wynn dissented in part, contending that class certification could easily be reviewed without delving into the dismissal motion.

Elegant Massage, LLC v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 2024 WL 995480 (4th Cir. Mar. 8, 2024), available at the Fourth Circuit and Westlaw

The Appeal Deadline & Subsequent Rule 59(e) Motions

In Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB v. Myers, the Fifth Circuit held that the grant of a Rule 59(e) motion results in a new judgment, such that a second Rule 59(e) motion reset the appeal clock. The decision illustrates the seemingly rare scenario in which a subsequent post-judgment motion can extend the time to appeal.

Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB v. Myers, 2024 WL 1146658 (5th Cir. Mar. 18, 2024), available at the Fifth Circuit and Westlaw

Appealing Future Orders

Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1) says that a notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days after entry of the judgment or order appealed from. Taken literally, Rule 4 might permit notices of appeal filed before the district court ever makes a decision. After all, that point in time is before—perhaps well before—30 days after the decision.

But courts don’t read the rule literally. They instead require that the notice be filed between the appealed decision and the expiration of the time to appeal. So in Wall Guy, Inc. v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., the Fourth Circuit dismissed an appeal that was filed before the appealed decision.

The decision illustrates the difference between two kinds of premature notices of appeal. Sometimes notices are filed after the appealed decision but before the entry of a judgment. Courts frequently relate those notices forward to entry of the judgment using the doctrine of cumulative finality. But a notice filed before the appealed decision is irredeemably premature.

A Lack of Finality Despite a Final Judgment

The classic definition of a “final decision” is one that ends litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the district court to do but enforce the judgment. So when a district court enters what it calls a “final judgment” and closes a case, it would seem that a final decision exists. But what if the district court (and the parties) have overlooked one or more claims?

In two recent cases—Shipman v. Aquatherm L.P. and Amerisure Insurance Co. v. Auchter Co.—courts of appeals held that the existence of unresolved crossclaims precluded a final decision, despite the district court’s entry of a judgment.

Amerisure Insurance Co. v. Auchter Co., 2024 WL 980089 (11th Cir. Mar. 7, 2024), available at the Eleventh Circuit and Westlaw

Shipman v. Aquatherm L.P., 2024 WL 957981 (3d Cir. Mar. 6, 2024), available at the Third Circuit and Westlaw

The Merger Doctrine After Sanction Dismissals

Courts have long held that the merger doctrine does not apply when an action is dismissed for a failure to prosecute. In Marquez v. Silver, the Second Circuit extended this holding to actions dismissed as a discovery sanction. The court explained that sanction dismissals carry the same risk of strategic behavior as failure-to-prosecute dismissals. The court also noted that if the sanction dismissal was proper, any errors in the district court’s other decisions are irrelevant.

Marquez v. Silver, 2024 WL 1289251 (2d Cir. Mar. 27, 2024), available at CourtListener and Westlaw

Appealing § 3605 Transfers

In United States v. Sastrom, the First Circuit held that it could review a supervised-release order despite the transfer of a criminal defendant’s case to another, out-of-circuit district. The transfer in Sastrom was under 18 U.S.C. § 3605. And the First Circuit treated this transfer the same as those under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a): so long as the appeal comes before the transfer is docketed, appellate jurisdiction exists.

United States v. Sastrom, 2024 WL 1130284 (1st Cir. Mar. 15, 2024), available at the First Circuit and Westlaw

A Dated Discussion of Rule 3(c)

In T.A. ex rel. Harmandjian v. County of Los Angeles, the Ninth Circuit determined that a notice of appeal designating the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion was sufficient to appeal the underlying judgment.

The decision was correct. But the discussion was entirely off point. Like several courts before it, the Ninth Circuit failed to recognize that Rule 3(c) was amended in 2021. And those amendments expressly address the situation in which a party designates only a post-judgment motion.

T.A. ex rel. Harmandjian v. County of Los Angeles, 2024 WL 1300003 (9th Cir. Mar. 27, 2024), available at the Ninth Circuit and Westlaw

The Fifth Circuit on Appealing Procedurally Improper Motions

In SEC v. Novinger, the Fifth Circuit dismissed an appeal because the district court had denied the appellant’s motion as procedurally improper.

Simplifying a bit, the defendant in Novinger was party to a consent decree with the SEC. Five years later, the defendant moved for relief from the judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), arguing that the decree violated the First Amendment. The district court denied that request, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed. The defendant then moved for declaratory relief, seeking a declaration that the requirements of the consent decree violated the First Amendment. The district court denied that, too. The defendant appealed again.

The Fifth Circuit dismissed the appeal. Although the order was part of post-judgment proceedings, it did not completely dispose of the relevant issues. In fact, the order did not adjudicate or dispose of any substantive issues.

The order instead explained—correctly, in the Fifth Circuit’s view—that a motion for declaratory relief was not the proper procedural vehicle for raising the relevant issues. “[A] motion for declaratory judgment does not lie where the action is not, itself, for declaratory judgment.” The proper vehicle was instead Rule 60(b).

SEC v. Novinger, 2024 WL 1161737 (5th Cir. Mar. 19, 2024), available at the Fifth Circuit and Westlaw

The Month’s Improper, Fact-Based Qualified-Immunity Appeals

Here are last month’s improper, fact-based qualified-immunity appeals:

Cook v. Bell, 2024 WL 889041 (11th Cir. Mar. 1, 2024), available at the Eleventh Circuit and Westlaw
Jok v. City of Burlington, 2024 WL 1122561 (2d Cir. Mar. 15, 2024), available at CourtListener and Westlaw
White v. Hamilton County, 2024 WL 1257508 (6th Cir. Mar. 25, 2024), available at the Sixth Circuit and Westlaw

Thanks to Michael Solimine for sending White v. Hamilton County to me.

Quick Note

In Borochov v. Islamic Republic of Iran, the D.C. Circuit held that the denial of a default judgment was a final decision. Those denials are normally not final. But in Borochov, the denial marked the end of district court litigation. The district court said the order was final and closed the case. The district court also entered a Rule 58 judgment. And “the court entertained a post-judgment motion, which would be out of place if the proceeding were still ongoing.”

Borochov v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 2024 WL 995897 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 8, 2024), available at the D.C. Circuit and Westlaw