Blog
In Upchurch v. O’Brien, the Seventh Circuit dismissed as untimely an appeal from a sanction-based award of attorneys fees. The court explained that an award of attorneys fees need not be set out in a separate document to start the appeal clock. Instead, the clock starts when the fees are awarded.
Continue reading....
In McEvoy v. Diversified Energy Co., the Fourth Circuit dismissed a somewhat convoluted invocation of sovereign immunity. The defendants appealed to argue that a district court’s Rule 19 decision effectively denied a non-party’s sovereign immunity. But the defendant had never itself sought immunity. Nor had the actual immunity holder intervened to protect its interests. The motion was instead only a decision that a state agency was not a party that should be joined under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19.
In In re Search Warrants Issued February 18, 2022, the Fourth Circuit dismissed an appeal that challenged the filter protocols for seized evidence. The district court had approved certain protocols to weed out potentially protected evidence. The district court later denied a privilege claimant’s motion seeking to alter those protocols. The Fourth Circuit held that under DiBella v. United States, the order was neither an appealable final decision nor an appealable denial of a preliminary injunction.
July was a fairly quiet month. But there were still a few decisions worth discussing.
In Hines v. Stamos (no PDF currently available), the Fifth Circuit spoke at length about its jurisdiction to review a personal-jurisdiction defense as part of an arbitration appeal. But the discussion was entirely unnecessary. The district court had never ruled on the personal-jurisdiction defense, meaning that there was no order to review. And the panel ultimately remanded the case for the district court to address personal-jurisdiction (as well as subject-matter jurisdiction), which might render the arbitration issue moot.
All of this could have been done without mentioning appellate jurisdiction over the personal-jurisdiction defense. The Fifth Circuit could have simply remanded the case for the district court to address personal jurisdiction in the first instance. And I think doing so would have been the better move—whether personal- and subject-matter-jurisdiction issues are within the scope of interlocutory appeals is a difficult, unsettled issues.
Robert H. Klonoff has posted a draft of his new article Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f): Reflections After a Quarter Century. The article includes new empirical data on appeals (and attempts to appeal) under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f) and updates my study from a few years ago. It also includes an analysis of Sixth Circuit opinions on Rule 23(f) motions (the Sixth Circuit is one of the few courts that regularly explains Rule 23(f) decisions) and a discussion of how cases that reached appellate courts through Rule 23(f) provided guidance on class-action procedure.
I read an earlier draft of this article and can highly recommend it. The draft is available on SSRN, and the abstract is below.
In Dubon v. Jaddou, the Fourth Circuit dismissed an appeal from an order remanding a naturalization action to the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. The court acknowledged that this remand order would be unreviewable in any future proceedings. But it thought that this lack of review was harmless, as the applicant could eventually obtain judicial review of the underlying naturalization decision.
In Abraham Watkins Nichols Agosto Aziz & Stogner v. Festeryga, the Fifth Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to review an order that remanded a removed action because the defendant had waived the right to remove. But the panel doubted that doing so was correct. Indeed, the panel seemed almost certain that its decision was wrong. But it was bound by the Fifth Circuit’s decision in In re Weaver, which held that 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) barred review of such a remand.
Quick roundup this month, starting with another expansion of the scope of qualified-immunity appeals.
Federal courts of appeals have spent a lot of energy determining whether litigants can appeal after a dismissal without prejudice. Some courts have declared that these dismissals are final decisions and thus generally appealable. And some courts—sometimes the same courts, albeit in different opinions—announce the opposite rule: that dismissals without prejudice are not generally appealable. Atop these contradictory general rules, courts have added a number of qualifications and exceptions.
In a new essay forthcoming in the Michigan Law Review Online, I argue that there is no helpful general rule about appealing dismissals without prejudice. That’s because the without-prejudice nature of a dismissal has little to do with appealability. Far more relevant is the nature of the underlying order. So appellate courts should focus on what the district court actually did, and not whether what it did was without prejudice. In fact, nothing would be lost—and much could be gained—if courts of appeals stopped looking to whether a dismissal was without prejudice when determining appealability.
The draft is available on SSRN. The abstract is below. Comments, as always, are welcome.
Final Decisions PLLC is an appellate boutique and consultancy that focuses on federal appellate jurisdiction. We partner with lawyers facing appellate-jurisdiction issues, working as consultants or co-counsel to achieve positive outcomes on appeal. Contact us to learn how we can work together.
Learn More Contact