Motions to Reconsider & Qualified-Immunity Appeals

In Blackwell v. Nocerini, the Sixth Circuit held that a motion to reconsider reset the time to take a qualified-immunity appeal. The denial of immunity was immediately appealable and thus a “judgment” under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. So a motion to reconsider that denial was effectively a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), despite the motion’s relying on a local rule rather than Rule 59(e). And that Rule 59(e) motion reset the appeal clock. The defendants could thus appeal the denial of immunity months after that denial. This conclusion let the Sixth Circuit avoid addressing whether a refusal to reconsider the denial of immunity is itself immediately appealable.

The Immunity & Reconsideration Denials in Blackwell

Blackwell stemmed from First Amendment claims against several city officials who allegedly retaliated against the plaintiff for criticizing the city’s manager. Invoking qualified immunity, the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint. But the district court denied that motion.

The defendants then sought reconsideration. Several months later, the district court denied that motion, too. Shortly thereafter, the defendants appealed.

Reconsideration, the Appeal Deadline, and Local Rules

The defendants’ appeal presented a few issues of appellate jurisdiction. But the Sixth Circuit did not need to decide them all.

Passing on the Appealability of Refusals to Reconsider Qualified-Immunity Denials

The first issue was whether the defendants could appeal at all.

The Supreme Court has held that the denial of immunity is a “final decision” under the collateral-order doctrine. So when a district court denies a defendant’s invocation of qualified immunity, a court of appeals normally has jurisdiction to review that decision under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

But the defendants in Blackwell had not immediately appealed from an immunity denial. They instead sought reconsideration. And a few courts have held that refusals to reconsider the denial of qualified immunity are not immediately appealable.

The Sixth Circuit was able to avoid this issue. That’s because the defendants had not appealed from the reconsideration denial. They instead appealed only the initial denial of their motion to dismiss. And that created a second appellate-jurisdiction issue: the timeliness of the appeal.

Resetting the Appeal Clock for Interlocutory Appeals

Again, the defendants in Blackwell had not appealed from the denial of their motion to dismiss within 30 days of that decision. The defendants instead waited until the district court denied reconsideration, which was several months later.

The Sixth Circuit held that the appeal was nevertheless timely. Under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(4), certain post-judgment-motions reset the appeal clock. Among those motions is one to alter or amend the judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e).

These rules apply to interlocutory decisions just as much as case-ending ones. (True, the denial of qualified immunity is technically a “final” decision and thus not interlocutory. But I find it much more useful to speak of interlocutory appeals as any appeals that come before a final judgment, regardless of whether appellate jurisdiction comes via § 1291 or some exception to the final-judgment rule.) Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(a) defines a “judgment” to include an appealable order. The denial of qualified immunity is thus a judgment. And a motion to reconsider the denial of immunity is thus a Rule 59(e) motion that resets the appeal clock. So the appeal clock did not begin to run in Blackwell until the district court denied reconsideration.

Motions to Reconsider Under a Local Rule

There was one more matter. The defendants had not invoked Rule 59(e). They had instead relied on Eastern District of Michigan Local Rule 7.1(h)(2)(A). That local rule authorizes motions to reconsider non-final orders. And Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(4) does not list a Local Rule 7.1 motion as one that resets the appeal clock.

The Sixth Circuit held that the motion in Blackwell was effectively one under Rule 59(e). The court had treated motions under Local Rule 7.1 as Rule 59(e) motions in the past. And the court thought that its recent decision in Miller v. William Beaumont Hospital—covered in last month’s roundup and, in full disclosure, a case on which I have consulted—did not change the outcome. Miller held that a recent amendment to Local Rule 7.1 meant that reconsideration motions under that rule targeting a final judgment could not effectively be Rule 59(e) motions. But the judgment in Blackwell was not a final one. So Miller did not cover the reconsideration motion in Blackwell.

The Term “Final”

One thought on the Sixth Circuit’s discussion of the term “final” in Local Rule 7.1. The court apparently felt the need to explain that “final” means two different things in this context:

The order denying the City Officials’ motion to dismiss was not a “final order[ ] or judgment[ ]” under Local Rule 7.1(h)(1). Rather, we read the word “final” in this local rule (unlike the word “final” in § 1291) consistent with its ordinary meaning to cover only an order completing the case. The order on appeal here did not end the case; it allowed the case to proceed past the pleadings. Local Rule 7.1(h)(2)(A) thus allowed the City Officials to move for reconsideration of this non-final order.

This discussion was unnecessary. The local rule speaks of final orders or judgments. And the denial of qualified immunity in Blackwell was neither.

It was instead a final decision. And final decisions and final judgments—and, for that matter, final orders—are not necessarily the same thing. So it’s not that “final” means something different in § 1291 and Local Rule 7.1. It’s that the things final qualifies—decisions, judgments, and orders—are different.

Thanks to Michael Solimine for sending this case my way.

Blackwell v. Nocerini, 2024 WL 5114313 (6th Cir. Dec. 16, 2024), available at the Sixth Circuit and Westlaw