No Remand Appeals in Naturalization Proceedings
In Dubon v. Jaddou, the Fourth Circuit dismissed an appeal from an order remanding a naturalization action to the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. The court acknowledged that this remand order would be unreviewable in any future proceedings. But it thought that this lack of review was harmless, as the applicant could eventually obtain judicial review of the underlying naturalization decision.
The Naturalization Proceedings in Dubon
Simplifying a bit, the plaintiff in Dubon had applied for naturalization. After some initial proceedings and an interview, the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service did nothing for over a year. The applicant then turned to the district court, filing an action under 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b). Section 1447(b) authorizes naturalization applicants to bring an action against the Service when the Service has delayed processing an application:
If there is a failure to make a determination under section 1446 of this title before the end of the 120-day period after the date on which the examination is conducted under such section, the applicant may apply to the United States district court for the district in which the applicant resides for a hearing on the matter. Such court has jurisdiction over the matter and may either determine the matter or remand the matter, with appropriate instructions, to the Service to determine the matter.
The applicant in Dubon asked the district court to decide his application. But the district court declined and instead remanded the action to the Service with instructions to decide the application within 15 days. The Service complied with that order and denied the application.
The applicant then appealed the district court’s decision to the FOurth Circuit, seeking review of the remand order. He argued that the agency had no good reason for the delay, such that the district court should have decided the application instead of remanding.
The Administrative-Remand Rule
As a general rule, district court decisions remanding disputes to an agency are not final or appealable. The main reason is that remands normally mean that more remains to be done in the agency. So the remand does not decide the action’s merits.
Courts have offered a few other reasons supporting the administrative-remand rule. An immediate appeal from a remand would likely require staying these administrative proceedings. An immediate appeal could also lead to piecemeal review. The court of appeals might hear a case twice—once after the administrative remand and again after any further administrative proceedings. And delaying review would consolidate all issues (from both the earlier agency action and the later agency action) into one appeal.
So parties generally have to wait until after the proceedings on remand before taking an appeal. But that’s not always the case, and exceptions to the general rule exist. For example, a remand is appealable when delaying any review might prevent a party—often the government—from obtaining any appellate review.
The Administrative-Remand in Dubon
The Fourth Circuit applied the administrative-remand rule to hold that the remand in Dubon was not a final decision. The remand did not end the litigation on the merits, as more—deciding the application—remained to be done.
The Fourth Circuit also held that the remand order was not appealable via the collateral-order doctrine. One of that doctrine’s requirements is that the appealed order be effectively unreviewable after a final judgment. And, to be sure, the remand order would not be reviewed. But were that enough to satisfy the collateral-order doctrine, “little would remain” of the general bar on appealing administrative remands.
The Fourth Circuit added that the interest at stake—avoiding agency adjudication and instead having an application decided by the district court—was insufficiently important to warrant an appeal. That’s because the Service’s denial of an application can be reviewed by a district court de novo, without any deference to the agency. “So whether the district court goes first (as Dubon would like) or second (after an agency remand), the end result is the same: Dubon gets a de novo district court decision on his eligibility for naturalization.”
Dubon v. Jaddou, 2024 WL 3558867 (4th Cir. July 29, 2024), available at the Fourth Circuit and Westlaw
Final Decisions PLLC is an appellate boutique and consultancy that focuses on federal appellate jurisdiction. We partner with lawyers facing appellate-jurisdiction issues, working as consultants or co-counsel to achieve positive outcomes on appeal. Contact us to learn how we can work together.
Learn More ContactRelated Posts
In City of Martinsville v. Express Scripts, Inc., a divided Fourth Circuit held that a court must stay proceedings—and not process a remand order—if the defendant appeals before the district court can send the remand order to the state court. The majority thought that the rule of Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co.—particularly as the […]
Continue reading....
In Abraham Watkins Nichols Agosto Aziz & Stogner v. Festeryga, the Fifth Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to review an order that remanded a removed action because the defendant had waived the right to remove. But the panel doubted that doing so was correct. Indeed, the panel seemed almost certain that its decision was […]
Continue reading....
In Roberts v. Smith & Wesson Brands, Inc., the Seventh Circuit affirmed a district court order remanding an action to state court. Although remand orders are generally not reviewable on appeal, the defendants in Roberts had invoked federal-officer removal and thus could obtain plenary review. But the Seventh Circuit seemed to think that this invocation […]
Continue reading....
Courts have held that when an “order” is appealable—say, via a certified appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) or an exception to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d)’s bar on remand appeals—the entirety of the district court’s order is within the scope of appeal. So when a district court certifies an order for an immediate appeal under § 1292(b), the […]
Continue reading....
In LeChase Construction Services, LLC v. Argonaut Insurance Co., the Second Circuit held that 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d)’s bar on remand appeals applied to remands under § 1447(e). But the court also held that it could review a remand that, while purportedly under § 1447(e), was actually based on “a patently nonjurisdictional ground, such as prudential considerations.” (Cleaned […]
Continue reading....Recent Posts
In Diaz v. FCA US LLC, the Third Circuit split over whether a district court had resolved distinct claims for purposes of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). The majority concluded that the district court had resolved only a distinct theory of recovery, not a distinct claim. Dissenting, Judge Phipps argued that claims are defined […]
Continue reading....
In Grippa v. Rubin, the Eleventh Circuit addressed the immediate appealability of Florida’s absolute and qualified litigation privileges. The court determined that the absolute privilege was immediately appealable via the collateral-order doctrine. But the qualified litigation privilege was not.
Continue reading....
Last month featured a Sixth Circuit debate over jurisdiction to review Brady issues in appeals from the denial of qualified immunity. There was also an especially odd Second Circuit decision in which the court exercised pendent appellate jurisdiction over a normally non-appealable issue even though the court lacked jurisdiction over any other issue. And there […]
Continue reading....
In two appeals—Clark v. Louisville-Jefferson County Metro Government and Salter v. City of Detroit, the Sixth Circuit spoke at length about its jurisdiction to review certain Brady issues as part of qualified-immunity appeals. The cases produced a total of six opinions, several of which dove into this jurisdictional issue.
Continue reading....
In Rossy v. City of Buffalo, the Second Circuit appeared to both dismiss a qualified-immunity appeal for a lack of jurisdiction and exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction over a plaintiff’s cross-appeal. This is odd. Pendent appellate jurisdiction allows normally non-appealable issues to tag along with appealable ones. But if the denial of qualified immunity was not […]
Continue reading....