Posts tagged “Qualified-Immunity Appeals”
In Fleming v. United States, the Eleventh Circuit became the fifth court of appeals to reject pure Bivens appeals. The court held that federal officials cannot immediately appeal the Bivens question without also appealing the denial of qualified immunity. Unlike some of the prior decisions, this one was unanimous. And it puts the government’s record at 0-5 on this issue.
Fleming provides a really nice overview of why the Bivens question should not be immediately appealable. The decision also offers some great discussion of the collateral-order doctrine’s third requirement—i.e., that an order be effectively unreviewable in an appeal after a final judgment. The Eleventh Circuit explained that this implicates both importance and urgency. In the court’s words, “[i]nterlocutory appeals are not for issues that are merely important; they are for issues that are important, now.”
In New Albany Main Street Properties v. Watco Companies, LLC, the Sixth Circuit held that it could not review a decision granting leave to amend as part of a qualified-immunity appeal. The leave-to-amend decision was not itself immediately appealable. Nor could it tag along with the denial of immunity (which technically involved qualified immunity under Kentucky law).
There is nothing all that remarkable in this outcome (though it’s always refreshing to see an appellate court decline to expand the scope or availability of qualified-immunity appeals). What’s interesting about New Albany is the court’s discussion of the connection between qualified immunity and an action’s merits.
In Blackwell v. Nocerini, the Sixth Circuit held that a motion to reconsider reset the time to take a qualified-immunity appeal. The denial of immunity was immediately appealable and thus a “judgment” under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. So a motion to reconsider that denial was effectively a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), despite the motion’s relying on a local rule rather than Rule 59(e). And that Rule 59(e) motion reset the appeal clock. The defendants could thus appeal the denial of immunity months after that denial. This conclusion let the Sixth Circuit avoid addressing whether a refusal to reconsider the denial of immunity is itself immediately appealable.
In Asante-Chioke v. Dowdle, the Fifth Circuit reviewed an order refusing to limit the scope of discovery to qualified-immunity issues. The court said that it could immediately review this sort of order via the collateral-order doctrine. But I have my doubts. The Fifth Circuit relied on a line of cases holding that defendants can appeal decisions to defer ruling on qualified immunity until after discovery. But there was no deferral in Asante-Chioke. And the Fifth Circuit’s decision opens the door to future appeals challenging the scope of discovery in civil-rights actions.
The federal government appears to be on a mission to get immediate appeals for orders recognizing a Bivens remedy. So far, those efforts have been unsuccessful. Two courts of appeals—the Third and the Sixth Circuits—have rejected these pure Bivens appeals.
In Mohamed v. Jones, the Tenth Circuit became the third. Like the Third and Sixth Circuits before it, the Tenth Circuit recognized that the Bivens question does not exist to shield federal officials from the burdens of litigation. That’s qualified immunity’s job. The separation-of-powers concerns that Bivens implicates also do not warrant an immediate appeal. And government defendants can easily secure review of the Bivens issue via an appeal from the denial of qualified immunity.
Mohamed is not the last we’ll see of this issue. There are at least two more pending cases in which the federal government is trying to appeal the Bivens question. And the Tenth Circuit’s decision came with a dissent. I will not be surprised when the government seeks rehearing en banc or, more likely, cert.
In Chaney-Snell v. Young, the Sixth Circuit held that Heck v. Humphrey issues are outside the scope of qualified-immunity appeals. In doing so, the Sixth Circuit joined the majority of circuits in the (lopsided) split on this matter. The court went on, however, to extend pendent appellate jurisdiction to a judicial-estoppel argument. Extending jurisdiction was necessary, the court explained, to effectively review the denial of qualified immunity.
While I agree with the Heck holding, I don’t agree with the review of the judicial-estoppel issue. The court’s rationale on the latter point would seem to allow plenary review of the factual basis for a district court’s immunity denial. And Johnson v. Jones normally prohibits that sort of review.
(For more on the scope of qualified-immunity appeals, see my article, Reforming Qualified-Immunity Appeals.)
As I’ve said many times on this site and in my scholarship, the genuineness of any factual disputes is normally not within the scope of interlocutory qualified-immunity appeals. There are some widely recognized exceptions to this rule. Two Eleventh Circuit cases from last month—Nelson v. Tompkins and Dempsey v. Sheriff—illustrated a less-well-recognized exception. The Eleventh Circuit said that it can review the genuineness of factual disputes so long as the defendant also challenges the existence of a clearly established constitutional violation. This seems to me to be a pretty mistaken end-run around the normal limits on qualified-immunity appeals.
In Argueta v. Jaradi, the Fifth Circuit created a new exception to the bar on reviewing the genuineness of fact disputes in qualified-immunity appeals. In most of those appeals, the court must take as given the district court’s determination of what facts a reasonable jury could find. But according to the Fifth Circuit, an appellate court doesn’t have to do that when video evidence exists.
In Washington v. City of St. Louis, the Eighth Circuit vacated a denial of qualified immunity because the district court misstated and misapplied the summary-judgment standard. The Eighth Circuit thought this was a legal issue over which it had jurisdiction in a qualified-immunity appeal.
But I’m not sure. Most (if not all) reversible summary-judgment decisions can be characterized as misunderstandings or misapplications of the summary-judgment standard. And Johnson v. Jones said that some of these reversible summary-judgment decisions—those involving evidence sufficiency—are off limits in immediate appeals from the denial of qualified immunity. Washington might have just restated the evidence-sufficiency inquiry in a way that gets around Johnson.
In Graber v. Doe II, a panel of the Third Circuit split on whether federal officials could immediately appeal the Bivens question without a qualified-immunity appeal. It’s the second decision in recent memory to reject a pure Bivens appeal. And this time, at least one judge was willing to hold that the Bivens issue was immediately appealable via the collateral-order doctrine.
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